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Note
Arming the Gun Industry:
A Critique of Proposed Legislation
Shielding the Gun Industry from Liability
Elizabeth T. Crouse*
Every year, tens of thousands of people die from firearmrelated injuries in the United States.' The long-term statistics
are shocking. From 1981 to 1999, firearms were responsible for
271,103 homicides, 337,954 suicides, and 26,294 unintentional
deaths in the United States.2 Gun violence falls particularly
harshly on the young, as tragically evidenced by the shootings
at Columbine High School.3 Studies reveal that gun violence is
among the leading causes of death among teenagers.4 Beyond
the statistics, the intangible social costs of gun violence, so
clearly demonstrated by the grip of fear that two men were able
to impose on the entire D.C. area with the aid of a single rifle,5
are immeasurable. Not surprisingly, given these sobering statistics, guns are a prevalent feature of American society. The
making and selling of guns is a big business in the United
States.6 The gun industry and its pro-gun rights supporters,
* J.D. Candidate, 2005; B.A., Carleton College. I would like to extend
my thanks to Professor Carl T. Bogus, for his thoughtful insights and comments, to the staff and board of the Minnesota Law Review, and to Lauren
Hancock and Emily Pruisner, whose advice, assistance, and counseling were
invaluable in writing this Note. I dedicate this Note to my mother and father,
Josephine Trubek and Barry Crouse, and to Paul Sherburne, for their years of
love, patience, and support.
1. See Linda Gunderson, The Financial Costs of Gun Violence, 131
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 483, 483 (1999), at http://www.annals.org/cgi/content/
full/131/6/483.
2. Rachana Bhowmik, Aiming for Accountability: How City Lawsuits Can
Help Reform an IrresponsibleGun Industry, 11 J.L. & POLY 67, 70 (2002).
3. See Three Detained in Shooting, CNN, at http://www.cnn.com/US/
9904120/school.shooting.04/index.html (Apr. 20, 1999).
4. Bhowmik, supra note 2, at 70-71.
5. See generally Ballistics Match Rifle to Sniper Attacks, CNN, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/South/10/24/sniper.shootings/ (Oct. 25, 2002).
6. In 1998, the U.S. gun industry's annual sales were approximately $1.4

1346

2004]

ARMING THE GUN INDUSTRY

1347

most prominently the National Rifle Association (NRA), also
wield considerable lobbying power in Congress and in state legislatures.
In the last twenty years, the connection between the gun
industry and gun violence has been investigated more closely
and disturbing discoveries have been made.8 In response, victims of gun violence increasingly have sought to hold the gun
industry responsible for its role in arming the perpetrators of
gun violence. 9 Recently, new breeds of plaintiffs, most notably
municipalities, alleging innovative causes of action have joined
in the wave of lawsuits seeking to hold the gun industry liable
for its part in fostering gun violence.' ° In these suits, the plaintiffs argue that numerous gun industry practices, including lax
distribution procedures and the designing and advertising of
firearms in a manner calculated to appeal to criminals, contribute significantly to the problem of gun violence." The plaintiffs also assert that the gun industry plays a key role in gun
violence by knowingly
permitting its products to fall into the
12
hands of criminals.

The U.S. Congress is now weighing in on this important issue. Prompted by the gun lobby, House Bill 1036 and Senate
Bill 659 were introduced during the 2003 session. 3 Theseidenbillion. William L. McCoskey, Note, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear
Arms Shall Not Be Litigated Away: Constitutional Implications of Municipal
Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry, 77 IND. L.J. 873, 901 (2002).
7. See Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A ComparativeInstitutionalAnalysis, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1247, 1251 (2000).
8. E.g., UCLA Study Finds Gun Dealers Willing to Aid Illegal Gun Sales,
U.S. NEWSWIRE, June 17, 2003, at 2003 WL 55658955. The alarming practices
of Bull's Eye Shooter Supply, a gun dealer in Washington State, and Bushmaster, a gun manufacturer, also provide good examples. See infra notes 3738 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 16-43 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 44-63 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Compl. at 6-9, Johnson v. Bull's Eye Shooter Supply (Wash.
Super. Ct. Pierce County) (No. 03-2-03932-8), available at http:ll
news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/gunlawsuits/jhnsnbeyell603cmp.pdf (last visited
Feb. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Sniper Complaint].
12. See, e.g., id.
13. S. 659, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. (2003); see also infra notes 92-119 and accompanying text. In late October of 2003, Senate Bill
1806, which is identical to Senate Bill 659, was introduced. S. 1806, 108th
Cong. (2003). Senate Bill 1805, which contained the same basic language and
structure of Senate Bill 659 and incorporated alterations suggested by Senators Craig, Daschle, and Baucus, was also introduced in late October of 2003.
S. 1805, 108th Cong. (2003); see Brady Ctr. to Prevent Handgun Violence, Why
S. 659, With Proposed Daschle-Craig-BaucusAmendment, Would Deny the
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tical bills would severely limit the ability of victims of gun violence to seek redress against the gun industry for their injuries. 4 The bills are making significant progress in Congress; in
April of 2003, the House passed House Bill 1036 by a substantial majority.15 The proposed legislation, if enacted, would have
a tremendous impact on victims' ability to sue the gun industry. Despite these potentially far-reaching effects, the bills have
not drawn widespread media attention. This Note seeks to shed
light on House Bill 1036, and any similar legislation proposed
in the future, by illuminating its provisions, its potential legal
shortcomings, and its ultimate impact on litigation against the
gun industry.
Part I traces the path followed by gun industry litigation,
including the recent trend of municipal lawsuits. It then discusses the response in state legislatures to this growing wave of
litigation. Lastly, it introduces House Bill 1036 and describes
its genesis. Part II delves into the text of House Bill 1036, comparing and contrasting its provisions with those of state laws
dealing with suits against the gun industry and noting potential constitutional problems with the bill. Part III provides an
analysis of the impact that House Bill 1036 would have on currently pending suits against the gun industry. Part III concludes by addressing the policy considerations implicated by
House Bill 1036 and any similar national legislation attempting to limit the gun industry's liability in suits brought by victims of gun violence.
This Note argues that the proposed legislation would only
impede the resolution of what remains the critical issue-the
horrific costs of gun violence in American society. The bill
would dampen collaboration between the judiciary and the legislature on this vital social issue and would stifle important
public debate. The full ramifications of such a law strongly
Rights of the D.C. Sniper Victims and Most Other Victims of Gun Violence, at
http://www.bradycampaign.orgxshare/0903/092903-rel.html (last visited Feb.
11, 2004). Senate Bill 1805 was defeated by a vote on March 2, 2004 after its
opponents succeeded in attaching several unrelated gun control amendments
to the bill, prompting the sponsors of the bill themselves to vote against it. 150
CONG. REC. S1999 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2004); Senate Kills Bill Protecting Gun
Makers, CNN, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/03/02/senate.guns/
index.html (Mar. 3, 2004). The amendments included a requirement for background checks of firearm purchasers at gun shows and an extension of the assault rifle ban. Senate Kills Bill Protecting Gun Makers, supra.
14. See discussion infra Part III.A.
15. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
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counsel against the enactment of House Bill 1036 or any similar legislation aimed at shielding the gun industry from civil
liability for its conduct.
I. THE ORIGINS OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION
LIMITING GUN INDUSTRY LIABILITY
A thorough analysis of the pending gun industry legislation requires an understanding of several underlying areas of
law: (1) the litigation instituted against the gun industry by
private parties and public entities for injuries resulting from
gun violence, (2) the legislative reaction in the states to this
wave of litigation, and (3) the impact of these state laws on lawsuits against the gun industry. Further, an examination of the
legislative history of House Bill 1036 and its current status in
Congress provides useful context for an in-depth analysis of the
bill.
A. LITIGATION AGAINST THE GUN INDUSTRY
1. Private Party Lawsuits
The last fifteen years have seen a surge in lawsuits by private parties against the gun industry for injuries arising out of
the unauthorized use of firearms by third parties, particularly

suits instituted by the families of victims of gun violence. 6 The

plaintiffs in these suits have asserted a wide array of causes of
action. 7 The first wave of lawsuits by private parties against
the gun industry typically asserted claims sounding in products
liability and negligence.' 8 The products liability claims in these
16. Private parties have long sought to hold gun manufacturers liable for
injuries arising from the malfunction of firearms. See, e.g., Stephan v. Marlin
Firearms Co., 353 F.2d 819 (2d Cir. 1965); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co.,
133 N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 1965). While such suits are important, this Note focuses on the more recent trend of litigation in which plaintiffs attempt to hold
the gun industry responsible for the injuries its products cause when employed
illegally, even when the products function precisely as they were designed to
function.
17. See Matthew Pontillo, Note, Suing Gun Manufacturers:A Shot in the
Dark, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1167, 1172-84 (2000) for a fairly succinct, if
somewhat one-sided, description of the most common causes of action alleged
by these plaintiffs.
18. See, e.g., Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200,
1205-06 (7th Cir. 1984) (dismissing plaintiffs' strict liability claim); Delahanty
v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 759 (D.C. 1989) (discussing plaintiffs' strict products liability and negligence claims); Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143,
1145 (Md. 1985) (enumerating plaintiffs' counts of strict liability and negli-

1350

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 88:1346

cases usually centered on an allegation of defective design or
failure to warn.1 9 Often closely linked to these products liability
claims were strict liability claims for
20 abnormally dangerous
(also termed ultrahazardous) activity.
In more recent suits against the gun industry, private parties have asserted additional causes of action, adding claims of
negligent distribution, negligent marketing, and public nuisance to their arsenal. 2' Among these more recent suits is the
landmark case of Young v. Bryco Arms." Young is one of the
first cases in which a private party's public nuisance claim
against the gun industry survived a motion to dismiss. 3 In
Young, family members of victims of gun violence sued numerous gun manufacturers and gun dealers, alleging that the defendants' business practices constituted a public nuisance by
contributing to the creation and maintenance of an underground market where youths and criminals could easily obtain
firearms. 4 In 2002, the Illinois Appellate Court held that the
gence).
19. E.g., McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 1997); Delahanty, 564 A.2d at 760-61. Typically these products liability claims invoke the
risk/utility test under which a plaintiff argues that a product is defective because the risks posed by the product outweigh its utility. See, e.g., McCarthy,
119 F.3d at 155; Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1148-49.
20. E.g., Martin, 743 F.2d at 1201-02; Delahanty, 564 A.2d at 760-61.
THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977) provides "[o]ne who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the
person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has
exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm." See also Marnie L. Sayles &
The Honorable James R. Lambden, Stop Shooting Down Tort Liability: It Is
Time to Resuscitate the Abnormally Dangerous Activity Doctrine Against
Handgun Manufacturers, 12 STAN. L. & POLy REV. 143 (2001) for a detailed
discussion of the elements and application of liability for abnormally dangerous activity.
21. See, e.g., McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 157 (dismissing plaintiffs' negligent
marketing and products liability claims against a gun manufacturer); Ileto v.
Glock, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1044 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (addressing public
nuisance and negligent distribution claims brought by family members of victims of criminal shootings), rev'd, 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003); Bubalo v.
Navegar, Inc., No. 96 C 3664, 1998 WL 142359, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 1998)
(dismissing plaintiffs' public nuisance claims against gun industry defendants).
22. 765 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
23. Id. at 20; see also Jon S. Vernick & Julie Samia Mair, State Laws Forbidding Municipalitiesfrom Suing the FirearmIndustry: Will FirearmImmunity Laws Close the Courthouse Door?, 4 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 126, 133
(2001).
24. Young, 765 N.E.2d at 5. The plaintiffs in Young alleged that the defendant gun manufacturers flood the Chicago area with handguns and employ
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plaintiffs' complaint stated a viable cause of action for public
nuisance against some of the defendants."
In contrast to Young, suits by private parties against the
gun industry have almost universally failed.26 Courts frequently cite plaintiffs' failure to point to an actual defect in the
firearm or ammunition in dismissing plaintiffs' products liability claims, noting that the firearm or ammunition functioned
exactly as it was designed to function. In dismissing negligence claims, courts often note the absence of a duty on the defendants' part and the lack of proximate causation due to the
intervening actions of a third party. 8 Claims regarding abnormally dangerous activity have also proven largely unsuccessful,
as courts typically conclude that the marketing of firearms is
not itself a dangerous activity.2 9 In addition, public nuisance
claims have been dismissed due to the defendants' perceived
lack of control over the nuisance at the time of the plaintiff's injury and the notion that public nuisance does not apply to the
lawful sale of products. ° Courts have also articulated a reluctance to impose liability on an industry that is already regulated by
statute, often
that the area of gun control is
bestleftto
" suggesting
31
best left to the legislature.
Nonetheless, private parties today continue to file suit
against the gun industry, and several such cases are currently
low-end retailers who facilitate the flow of handguns into Chicago. Id. at 6.
25. Id. at 20.
26. Shaun R. Bonney, Comment, Using the Courts to Target Firearm
Manufacturers, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 167, 168 (2000). A recent decision by the
Ninth Circuit may indicate that this trend is starting to change. In November
of 2003, the Ninth Circuit held that a suit brought by survivors and family
members of victims of a criminal shooting spree against the manufacturers
and dealers of the guns used in the shootings survived the defendants' motion
to dismiss, reversing the lower court's decision. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d
1191, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003).
27. E.g., McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 155 (2d Cir. 1997); Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 760 (D.C. 1989). Courts have held that plaintiffs must point to a specific defect in a firearm's design before the products
liability risk/utility test can be applied. E.g., McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 155; Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1149 (Md. 1985).
28. E.g., Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d 21, 30 (2d Cir. 2001);
Bloxham v. Glock, Inc., 53 P.3d 196, 198 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).
29. E.g., Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204-05
(7th Cir. 1984); Delahanty, 564 A.2d at 761.
30. E.g., Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1060-61 (C.D. Cal.
2002), rev'd, 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003).
31. E.g., Bloxham, 53 P.3d at 200; Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116,
133 (Cal. 2001).
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pending. In Dix v. Beretta, a suit that has attracted national attention, the parents of a teenager who was accidentally shot
and killed by a friend brought suit against the manufacturer of
the firearm asserting defective design and failure to warn
claims. 2 In 1998, the case went to trial, and the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the manufacturer on all counts.3 However,
the plaintiffs were granted a new trial after significant juror
misconduct came to light.34 In 2002, the California Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's grant of a new trial, and a new
trial took place in December of 2003, ending in a mistrial.35
Most recently, family members of the D.C.-area sniper victims have made headlines by filing a lawsuit against both
Bushmaster Firearms (Bushmaster), the manufacturer of the
firearm used in the sniper shootings, and Bull's Eye Shooter
Supply (Bull's Eye), the retailer from which the gun was obtained. The complaint alleges that the retailer committed
gross negligence in the operation of its store by permitting numerous firearms to "disappear" and by failing to keep accurate
records of its sales. The complaint also alleges that Bushmaster should have been aware that the assault rifle used by the
D.C. snipers would be a weapon of choice for criminals and
would be "particularly well-adapted to sniper military-style as32. The facts of Dix v. Beretta are utterly tragic. The victim and his teenaged friend were playing with the friend's father's gun. Brady Ctr. to Prevent
Handgun Violence, New Trial Granted in Dix v. Beretta, at
http://www.bradycampaign.org/press/release.php?release=12 (Sept. 11, 2000)
[hereinafter Brady Center: Dix v. Beretta]. In jest, the friend removed the
loaded ammunition magazine, replaced it with an empty magazine, pointed
the gun at Kenzo Dix, and fired, thinking the gun was empty. Id. The semiautomatic handgun retained a bullet in its chamber even after the magazine had
been removed, and fifteen-year-old Kenzo was killed. Id. The plaintiffs are attempting to hold Beretta, the manufacturer of the gun, liable on a defective
design theory for failing to incorporate safety devices into the handgun. The
Legal Action Project, Brady Ctr. to Prevent Handgun Violence, Current Cases:
Dix. v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., at http://www.gunlawsuits.org/docket/
casestatus.asp?RecordNo=25 (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Dix Case
Status].
33. Dix Case Status, supra note 32.
34. Brady Center: Dix v. Beretta, supra note 32.
35. Dix v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. A093082, 2002 WL 187397 (Cal. Ct.
App. Feb. 6, 2002); Kiley Russell, Civil Trial in Accidental Shooting Ends in
Mistrial, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Calif.), Dec. 23, 2003, at http:l!
www.contracostatimes.com/mld/cctimes/news/7559405.htm; Dix Case Status,
supra note 32. A new trial could be scheduled in early 2004. Russell, supra.
36. See Sniper Complaint, supra note 11.
37. Id. at 3 (alleging that "[alt least 238 guns 'disappeared' from Bull's
Eye in the last three years alone").
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saults."3 8 The plaintiffs assert public nuisance and negligence
claims against the gun industry defendants. 9 The case is
scheduled for trial in November of 2004.40
Lately, organizations, most notably the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), have also
filed suits against the gun industry.41 In its suit, the NAACP alleges that gun manufacturers' distribution and marketing practices create a public nuisance that disproportionately harms
African-Americans.4 2 The federal district court for the Eastern
District of New York dismissed the suit, holding that the
NAACP failed to demonstrate that it had sustained injuries different in kind from those suffered by the public at large, a necessary element of a public nuisance claim by a private party.43
2. Public Entity Lawsuits
In the last five years, numerous government entities, particularly municipalities, have joined the fray in filing lawsuits
against the gun industry. On October 30, 1998, New Orleans
became the first city to bring suit against members of the gun
industry.4 4 New Orleans filed suit against numerous gun manufacturers, retailers, and distributors under products liability
and negligence theories.4 5 Since then more than thirty cities
and counties have filed suit against members of the gun industry.4 6 The plaintiffs in these suits raise a variety of causes of action. Public nuisance, strict products liability, negligent mar38. Id. at 18, 20.
39. Id. at 26-30.
40. Pierce County Sup. Ct., Calendar, Johnson v. Bull's Eye Shooter Supply, Case No. 03-2-03932-8, at http://www.co.pierce.wa.us/cfapps/linx/calendar/
GetCivilCase.cfm?cause-num =03-2-03932-8 (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
41. See, e.g., NAACP v. Acusport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435 (E.D.N.Y.
2003). Several organizational plaintiffs joined the city of Philadelphia in its
suit against the gun industry. Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d
415, 419 n.1 (3d. Cir. 2002).
42. Acusport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 446-47, 451.
43. Id. at 451.
44. See Brady Ctr. to Prevent Handgun Violence, New Orleans First City
to Sue Gun Manufacturers: Center to Prevent Handgun Violence Co-counsel in
Landmark Lawsuit, at http://www.bradycampaign.orgtpress/release.asp?
Record=143 (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
45. Compl. at 12-16, Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp. (La. Civ. Dist. Ct.
1998) (No. 98-18578), available at http://www.gunlawsuits.orgdocket/cities/
cityview.asp?RecordNo= 1.
46. Annie Tai Kao, Note, A More Powerful Plaintiff:State PublicNuisance
Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 212, 213 (2002).
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keting, negligent distribution, and failure to warn are the most
prevalent claims asserted by municipal plaintiffs.47 In addition,
several suits raise claims for unjust enrichment, deceptive advertising, civil conspiracy, and fraud.48
These suits have met with mixed results in the courts.
Many have been dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. 9 Some municipalities' suits, however, have succeeded in surviving motions to dismiss or have
had dismissals reversed on appeal. 50 In City of Cincinnati v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., for example, Cincinnati brought suit
against members of the gun industry asserting nine causes of
action, including negligence, public nuisance, products liability,
fraud, and deceptive advertising.5 ' The Supreme Court of Ohio
47. E.g., Compl. at 16-18, Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp. (Conn. Super.

Ct. Jan. 27, 1999) (No. CV-99-036-1279) (asserting products liability causes of
action), available at http://www.gunlawsuits.com/downloads/bridgeport.pdf;
Compl. at 25-27, Dist. of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. (D.C. Super. Ct.
Jan. 20, 2000) (No. 00-0000428) (asserting negligent distribution and public
nuisance causes of action), available at http://www.gunlawsuits.coml
downloads/washdc.pdf; Compl. at 67-70, City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp. (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County Nov. 12, 1998) (No. 98 CH 015596) (asserting a
public nuisance cause of action), available at http://www.gunlawsuits.coml
downloads/chicago.pdf; Compl. at 24-26, City of Camden v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 21, 1999) (No. CAM-L-4510-99) (asserting negligent marketing and negligent distribution claims), available at
http://www.gunlawsuits.com/downloads/camdencity.pdf; Compl. at 28-32, 3437, City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. (Ohio Ct. C.P. Hamilton County
Apr. 28, 1999) (No. A9902369) (asserting products liability, failure to warn,
negligence, and public nuisance causes of action), available at
http://www.gunlawsuits.com/downloads/cincin.pdf.
48. E.g., Compl. at 18-20, 32-34, Ganim (No. CV-99-036-1279) (asserting
deceptive advertising and civil conspiracy causes of action); Compl. at 31-32,
City of Camden (No. CAM-L-4510-99) (asserting an unjust enrichment claim);
Compl. at 37-40, City of Cincinnati (No. A9902369) (asserting fraud, unjust
enrichment, and negligent misrepresentation claims).
49. E.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 419
(3d Cir. 2002); Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 542 (3d Cir. 2001); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780
A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001); Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1 (La.
2001); Mayor of Detroit v. Arms Tech., Inc., 669 N.W.2d 845, 862 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2003).
50. E.g., White v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 830 (N.D.
Ohio 2000); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 785 N.E.2d 16, 31 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2002); James v. Arms Tech., Inc., 820 A.2d 27, 53. (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2003); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136,
1141 (Ohio 2002).
51. City of Cincinnati, 768 N.E.2d at 1140 ("The gist of the complaint is
that appellees have manufactured, marketed, and distributed their firearms in
ways that ensure the widespread accessibility of the firearms to prohibited us-
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reversed the trial court's dismissal of Cincinnati's claims and
permitted the city to proceed on all of the causes of action alleged.52
Similarly, in City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., the Illinois Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's dismissal of
Chicago's public nuisance claim against members of the gun
industry.53 The city alleged that the defendants' distribution
and sales practices, including oversupplying the market for
handguns and failing to properly supervise gun dealers, "unreasonably facilitate the unlawful possession and use of firearms in Chicago," thereby creating a public nuisance.5 4 The
Chicago lawsuit is currently pending.55
In June of 2000, following the municipalities' lead, New
York became the first state to file suit against the gun indus-

ers, including children and criminals."); see also Compl. at 28-40, City of Cincinnati (No. A9902369).
52. City of Cincinnati, 768 N.E.2d at 1141. The court also concluded that
the doctrine of remoteness did not operate to bar the city's claims. Id. at 1149.
The doctrine of remoteness imposes a limit on tort liability by providing that a
plaintiff generally cannot recover for injuries sustained by third parties. Anne
Giddings Kimball & Sarah L. Olson, Municipal FirearmsLitigation: Ill Conceived from Any Angle, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1277, 1288 (2000). As the Supreme
Court has articulated it, a plaintiff "who complain[s] of harm flowing merely
from the misfortunes visited upon a third person by the defendant's acts [is]
generally said to stand at too remote a distance to recover." Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268-69 (1992). The remoteness doctrine thus
requires that the harm suffered by the plaintiff be a direct, rather than remote, result of the defendant's conduct. Ganim, 780 A.2d at 118-20. Courts
faced with municipal lawsuits against the gun industry have frequently relied
on the doctrine of remoteness in dismissing the plaintiffs' claims, concluding
that the municipalities' injuries are merely derivative of the injuries sustained
by the individual victims of gun violence. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia,277
F.3d at 422-24; Ganim, 780 A.2d at 121-23 (discussing the remoteness issue
in the context of standing).
Facing mounting legal costs and an uncertain outcome, Cincinnati elected
to drop its suit in May of 2003. The Legal Action Project, Brady Ctr. to Prevent
Handgun
Violence,
Reforming
the
Gun
Industry, at
http:/!
www.gunlawsuits.org/docket/cities/cityview.asp?RecordNo=ll
(last visited
Feb. 16, 2004).
53. City of Chicago, 785 N.E.2d at 31.
54. Id. at 20. The defendants' practices are particularly egregious in this
case in light of the fact that most handguns are illegal within the Chicago city
limits. See Compl. at 11-12, City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. (Ill. Cir.
Ct. Cook County Nov. 12, 1998) (No. 98 CH 015596).
55. Suits by Cleveland and Newark are also pending, having survived motions to dismiss. See The Legal Action Project, Brady Ctr. to Prevent Handgun
Violence, Public Entity Firearms Litigation, at http://www.gunlawsuits.org/
docket/cities/public.asp (last visited Feb. 16, 2004).
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try.56 In its complaint, New York alleged that the gun industry
defendants' marketing, manufacturing, and distribution practices create a public nuisance in New York." The trial court
dismissed the state's claims, and the New York Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. 58 The Appellate Division concluded
that the state's injuries were too remote from the defendants'
conduct for the state to maintain its cause of action.5 9
In addition to the suits in which plaintiffs' claims have
survived a motion to dismiss, a victory of another kind came for
plaintiffs in March of 2000 when Smith & Wesson signed a settlement agreement with numerous municipalities and two
states. ° In the agreement, Smith & Wesson agreed to a number
of reforms of its distribution and manufacturing practices in
exchange for being dropped from lawsuits instituted by the
agreement's signatories.6 ' The settlement has been widely
hailed as a victory for the plaintiffs, as it takes steps towards
resolving many of the concerns expressed by the plaintiffs in
their complaints.6 2 The settlement, however, raised a furor
among gun rights groups who felt that Smith & Wesson had

56. Kao, supra note 46, at 213.
57. People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 194 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2003).
58. Id. at 204.
59. Id. at 201.
60. See Save Our Guns, Smith & Wesson Agreement, at http://
www.saveourguns.com/Smith%20&%2OWesson%2OAgreementO3.htm
(Mar.
17, 2000). The parties to the agreement included the states of New York and
Connecticut and several cities, including Atlanta, Georgia; Berkeley, California; Bridgeport, Connecticut; Camden, New Jersey; Detroit, Michigan; Gary,
Indiana; Los Angeles, California; and St. Louis, Missouri. Id.
61. See id. Some of the more significant provisions of the agreement include a requirement that dealers perform background checks on purchasers at
gun shows, the termination of sales to dealers whose guns are disproportionately linked to crimes, the installation of internal locking devices on all firearms manufactured by Smith & Wesson within two years, the installation of
personalized technology on all new firearms within three years, and the requirement of a hidden serial number on all firearms. Id. As part of the agreement, the federal government also has agreed not to file suit against Smith &
Wesson, as it had threatened to do. Amy Paulson, Smith & Wesson Agrees to
Landmark Gun Safety Settlement, CNN, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/
ALLPOLITICS/stories/03/17/gun.lawsuit/ (Mar. 17, 2000).
62. Pauison, supra note 61. Even more recently, two gun dealers and
three gun distributors agreed to alter their practices in exchange for being released from a lawsuit brought by several California cities and counties. Brady
Ctr. to Prevent Handgun Violence, Gun Dealers,DistributorsAgree to Reforms
to Curb Illegal Market in California,at http://www.bradycampaign.org/press/
release.php?Record=503 (Aug. 21, 2003).
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weakened the position of the gun industry by breaking ranks
with other manufacturers.63
B. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE IN THE STATES
There has been a significant legislative response at the
state level to the explosion of suits against the gun industry,

particularly the suits by municipalities. 6 The Georgia state legislature was the first to address the recent wave of lawsuits.6 5
In 1999, the Georgia General Assembly enacted a statute that
prohibits governmental units of the state from bringing suit
against the gun industry for "damages, abatement or injunctive

relief' resulting from the "lawful design, manufacture, marketing, or sale of firearms or ammunition."6 6 Following in Georgia's
footsteps, approximately thirty states have enacted laws limit-

ing the gun industry's liability for injuries resulting from the
manufacture, sale, and use of firearms.6

63.

Four years after the

See Will Evans, Gun Company Agrees to Safety Standards, THE DAILY

CALIFORNIAN,

Mar.

20,

2000,

available

at

http://www.dailycal.org/

article.php?id=1980; Gun Owners of Am., GOA Announces Boycott of Clinton
& Wesson-Sell-out Worse than Originally Reported, at http://
www.hipweb.net/jgrisafi/points/GOAAlert.html (Mar. 21, 2000).
64. The state laws limiting gun industry liability can be divided into two
rough categories. The first category includes statutes aimed specifically at
barring suits by political subdivisions of a state, all of which have been enacted in the last five years. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-16-504 (Michie Supp.
2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4501 (Supp. 2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.045
(Michie Supp. 2003). The second category is composed of laws, typically passed
under state products liability statutes, which specifically limit products liability actions against the gun industry. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-21-501
to -505 (2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.60 (West Supp. 2004). This Note

discusses both types of statutes in tandem because both have an impact on
plaintiffs' ability to sue the gun industry.
65.

GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-184 (2003).

66. Id. The Georgia statute was enacted largely in response to a suit instituted by the city of Atlanta against numerous gun manufacturers and gun
dealers. See Brent W. Landau, State Bans on City Gun Lawsuits, 37 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 623, 626-27 (2000).
67. ALA. CODE § 11-80-11 (Supp. 2003); ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.155 (Michie
2002); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-714 (West 2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-16504; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-21-501 to -505; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.331 (West
Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-184; IDAHO CODE § 5-247 (Michie Supp.
2003); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-12-3-1 to -5 (Michie Supp. 2003); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-4501; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.045; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800;
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1799 (West 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A,
§ 2005 (West Supp. 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.435 (West Supp.
2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-67 (Supp. 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-115
(2002); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 12.107 (Michie Supp. 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-409.40 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-11 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-
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Georgia statute was enacted, states continue to enact such
laws. 8 Much of this legislation has been spearheaded by the
lobbying efforts of the NRA, which has been highly critical of
the recent suits against the gun industry.6 9
These state laws vary widely in their scope, but a few provisions are common to many of the laws. In particular, the majority of the state laws limiting suits against the gun industry
only bar suits brought by governmental subdivisions of the
state.7 ° Such statutes generally reserve to the state and to private parties the right to sue the gun industry.71 These statutes
also typically contain an exception to the general prohibition on
03-54 (Supp. 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.40.1 (Anderson 2003); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.24a (West Supp. 2004); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6120 (West Supp. 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 21-58-1 to -4 (Michie Supp. 2003); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-17-1314 (2003); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 128.001
(Vernon Supp. 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-64 (2002); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 15.2-915.1 (Michie 2003); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-18-1 to -2 (Michie Supp.
2003).
68. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:21 (passed as 2003 N.H. Laws 267:2
on July 15, 2003). New Hampshire's law went into effect on January 1, 2004.
Id. In addition, in May of 2003, the Missouri General Assembly passed Senate
Bill 13, curtailing political subdivisions' ability to sue the gun industry, and in
September of 2003, the General Assembly enacted the bill into law over the
governor's veto. MO. ANN. STAT. § 21.750 (West Supp. 2004); 2003 Bill Tracking Mo. S.B. 13.
In contrast, California recently repealed its laws limiting suits against the
gun industry. After a controversial decision by the California Supreme Court,
the California legislature repealed section 1714.4 of the California Civil Code,
which provided gun manufacturers with immunity from suit under a products
liability risk/utility cause of action. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.4 (West 2001) (repealed 2002); see also John Fowler, Will a Repeal of Gun ManufacturerImmunity from Civil Suits Untie the Hands of the Judiciary?,34 MCGEORGE L. REV.
339, 347-48 (2003).
69. Vernick & Mair, supra note 23, at 128. The recent surge in lawsuits
against the gun industry has also drawn criticism from numerous legal scholars who argue that the causes of action alleged in these suits lack legal merit.
E.g., Lawrence S. Greenwald & Cynthia A. Shay, Municipalities'Suits Against
Gun Manufacturers-Legal Folly, 4 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 13 (2000);
Pontillo, supra note 17. But see Bhowmik, supra note 2 (arguing that litigation
against the gun industry is an essential means of encouraging the gun industry to change its harmful practices); Sayles & Lambden, supra note 20 (arguing that the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine should be applied in suits
against the gun industry as a way to hold the industry accountable for its conduct).
70. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-80-11; ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-16-504; GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-11-184; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4501; KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 65.045; TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 128.001; VA. CODE ANN.
§ 15.2-915.1; W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-18-1 to -2.
71. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 70.
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suit by governmental subdivisions for causes of action based on
breach of warranty or breach of contract."
Some of the state laws, however, bar a wider spectrum of
suits. For instance, Utah's statute prohibits the state as well as
political subdivisions of the state from suing the gun industry. 3
Colorado's statute forbids both private parties and governmental entities from bringing suit for injuries caused by a firearm
under any legal theory other than products liability.74 Alaska's
statute, one of the broadest, bars nearly all civil actions instituted by private parties and governmental entities if the "action is based on the lawful sale, manufacture, or design of firearms or ammunition." 5 Indiana's statutory limitation on suit
also applies to actions by both private parties and public entities. 6 In addition, many of the state statutes contain explicit
statements of the law intended to limit the gun industry's liability under particular causes of action. These laws typically
prohibit suits brought on the products liability theory that firearms are defective in design because their risks outweigh their
social utility.78 Several of the state laws also contain provisions

specifying that the statute shall apply retroactively to actions
pending at the time of enactment as well as to future lawsuits. 9

72. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 70.
73. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-64 (2002).
74. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-21-501 to -505 (2003).
75. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.155 (Michie 2002). The only permissible causes
of action against the gun industry under this statute are for negligent design,
manufacturing defect, and breach of contract or warranty. Id.
76. IND. CODE ANN. §§.34-12-3-1 to -5 (Supp. 2003).
77. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-503 ("The inherent potential of a firearm or ammunition to cause injury, damage, or death when discharged shall
not be a basis for finding that the product is defective in design or manufacture."); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-184 (2003) ("[T]he lawful design, marketing,
manufacture, or sale of firearms or ammunition to the public is not unreasonably dangerous activity and does not constitute a nuisance per se."); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 21-58-1 (Michie Supp. 2003) ("[Tlhe unlawful use of firearms, rather than their lawful manufacture, distribution, or sale, is the
proximate cause of any injury arising from their unlawful use.").
78. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-503; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1799
(West 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-11 (2003) ("[W]hether a firearm or ammunition shell is defective in design shall not be based on a comparison or
weighing of the benefits of the products against the risk of injury. ..

.").

These

provisions are targeted at claims such as those discussed supra note 19 and
accompanying text.
79. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1799; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 28.435 Sec. 15 (West Supp. 2003); Mo. REV. STAT. § 21.750 (2003).
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C. THE IMPACT OF STATE LAWS BARRING SUITS AGAINST THE
GUN INDUSTRY

Many of the state statutes have already had effects on lawsuits against the gun industry, particularly on suits brought by
municipalities. In Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. v. City of Atlanta,
the Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's dismissal
of Atlanta's negligence and strict liability claims against members of the gun industry.0 The court held that the city's claims
were barred by the recently enacted section 16-11-184 of the
Georgia Code, which prohibits any governmental unit other
than the state from bringing suit against a firearms manufacturer, dealer, or trade association for any cause of action other
than breach of contract or warranty. 8' The court further held
that the retroactive application of the statute to bar a suit that
had been filed before the statute was enacted did not pose any
constitutional problems. 2
Similarly, in Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp. the Supreme
Court of Louisiana held that section 40:1799 of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes acted retroactively to bar New Orleans's suit
against members of the gun industry.13 The court rejected the
city's contention that the statute violated the Louisiana Constitution and the U.S. Constitution when applied to a suit commenced before it was enacted. 4 The court also concluded that
the statute was a valid exercise of the state's police power and
did not violate the separation of powers doctrine."
More recently, the Michigan Court of Appeals relied on sec80. Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. City of Atlanta, 560 S.E.2d 525, 527 (Ga. Ct.
App.2002).
81. Id. at 530; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-184. The statute was enacted only five days after Atlanta filed its suit. City of Atlanta, 560 S.E.2d at
527.
82. Id., at 531. The court also rejected the city's argument that section 1611-184 of the Georgia Code did not apply to the city's claims because the statute only bars suits arising from the lawful manufacture and marketing of firearms, while the city was alleging unlawful conduct. Id.; see also GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-11-184.
83. Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1, 7 (La. 2001); see also
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1799 ("The governing authority of any political subdivision ...of the state is precluded and preempted from bringing suit to recover against any firearms or ammunition manufacturer, trade association, or
dealer for damage ...resulting from or relating to the lawful design, manufacture, marketing, or sale of firearms or ammunition.").
84. Morial, 785 So. 2d at 13.
85. Id. at 15, 19.
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tion 28.435 of the Michigan Compiled Laws in dismissing Detroit's suit against the gun industry." The court concluded that
Michigan's law effectively prohibits suits by municipalities
against the gun industry on a wide range of causes of action."
The courts in all of these cases have consistently noted the
broad power of states to limit the conduct of municipalities. 88
The state statutes have also impacted suits instituted by
private parties. In Merril v. Navegar, in a controversial decision, the California Supreme Court held that section 1714.4 of
the California Civil Code barred an action brought by family
members of victims of a mass shooting in San Francisco. 89 The

statute provided that in "a products liability action, no firearm
or ammunition shall be deemed defective in design on the basis
that the benefits of the product do not outweigh the risk of injury posed by its potential to cause... death when discharged."" The court held that the statute necessitated the
dismissal of the plaintiffs' negligence claim because the negligence claim required the same risk/benefit analysis as a products liability claim.9'
These cases provide ample evidence that the state statutes
have had a significant impact on lawsuits against the gun industry. These state statutes, however, cannot affect gun industry litigation taking place outside of those states. A national
86. Mayor of Detroit v. Arms Tech., Inc., 669 N.W.2d 845, 855 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2003); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.435 (West Supp. 2003) ("[A]
political subdivision shall not bring a civil action against any person who produces a firearm or ammunition.").
87. Mayor of Detroit, 669 N.W.2d at 861-62. The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments that the statute violates due process, the separation of powers
doctrine, and the Title-Object Clause of the Michigan Constitution. Id. at 85462.
88. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 560 S.E.2d 525, 531 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2002); Morial, 785 So. 2d at 11-13; Mayor of Detroit, 669 N.W.2d at
856.
89. Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 119 (Cal. 2001); see also CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1714.4 (West 2001) (repealed 2002). The California legislature
has since repealed the statute. 2002 Cal. Stat. 913 § 2.
90. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.4 (emphasis added).
91. Merrill, 28 P.3d at 125. Additionally, the Arizona Court of Appeals referred to an Arizona statute that barred municipalities from suing the gun industry in dismissing a case brought by a privateparty against a gun manufacturer. Bloxham v. Glock, Inc., 53 P.3d 196, 200 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); see also
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-714 (West 2003). The court noted that the import
of the statute, that firearms manufacturers should not be held liable for harm
caused by the misuse of their products, while not binding on the court in that
particular case, "deserves considerable weight as a legislative expression of
public policy." Bloxham, 53 P.3d at 200.
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law limiting lawsuits against the gun industry therefore would
change the landscape of gun industry litigation significantly.
D. CONGRESS TAKES ACTION: HOUSE BILL 1036

In response to the growing wave of lawsuits against the
gun industry, members of Congress have proposed two identical bills, House Bill 1036 and Senate Bill 659, that would severely limit the liability of gun and ammunition manufacturers, dealers, distributors, and trade associations.9 2 House Bill
1036 purports to "prohibit civil liability actions from being
brought or continued against manufacturers, distributors,
dealers, or importers of firearms or ammunition for damages
resulting from the misuse of their products by others."93 House
Bill 1036 is fairly uncomplicated in structure.9 4 Its first two sections state its short title and recite at great length the purposes
behind the bill.95 These stated purposes include the preservation of citizens' Second Amendment rights, the protection of interstate commerce, and the prevention of "an abuse of the legal
92. S. 659, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. (2003). The short
title of the bill is the 'Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act." S. 659 § 1;
H.R. 1036 § 1. Representative Clifford Stearns, Republican of Florida, introduced the House version, House Bill 1036, on February 27, 2003. 149 CONG.
REC. H1464 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2003). Senator Larry Craig, Republican of
Idaho, introduced the Senate version, Senate Bill 659, on March 19, 2003. Id.
S3998 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2003). Craig later introduced another identical version of the bill, Senate Bill 1806. Id. S13711 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 2003).
Another version of the bill was also introduced in the House by Representative Everett, Republican of Alabama, on January 27, 2003, entitled "Firearms Heritage Protection Act of 2003." H.R. 357, 108th Cong. (2003). The provisions of that bill are similar to those of House Bill 1036, although the scope
of immunity from suit was a bit broader under House Bill 357. Id. The passage
of House Bill 1036 rendered House Bill 357 unnecessary.
93. H.R. 1036.
94. Currently, Senate Bill 659 is identical in structure and content to
House Bill 1036. However, Senators Daschle, Craig, and Baucus have circulated proposed amendments to Senate Bill 659. See Brady Ctr. to Prevent
Handgun Violence, supra note 13. These amendments were incorporated into
Senate Bill 1805, a newer version of Senate Bill 659, which was introduced in
October of 2003. S. 1805, 108th Cong. (2003). Senate Bill 1805 proposed ten
changes to Senate Bill 659, none of which dramatically changed its scope. Id.
In March of 2004, Senate Bill 1805 was voted down in the Senate after opponents attached unrelated gun control amendments to it. See supra note 13.
This Note therefore focuses on the provisions of House Bill 1036 but notes areas of potential difference with Senate Bill 1805 since that version of the bill
garnered significant bipartisan support, making it likely that a future bill
would include the same or similar alterations embodied in Senate Bill 1805.
See Brady Ctr. to Prevent Handgun Violence, supra note 13.
95. H.R. 1036.
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system."96
After outlining the bill's context, the bill tersely provides
that "[a] qualified civil liability action may not be brought in
any Federal or State court."97 Section 4 of the bill then fleshes
out the meaning of this prohibition by providing numerous
definitions. Most critically, the term "qualified civil liability action" is defined as any civil lawsuit instituted against a gun or
ammunition manufacturer, dealer, importer, or trade association seeking redress of injuries "resulting from the criminal or
unlawful misuse" of a firearm, subject to five listed exceptions. 9
Congressional proponents and opponents of House Bill
1036 have vigorously defended their respective stances on the
issue of gun industry immunity from suit. Advocates for the bill
argue that it is a necessary measure to stem the tide of "frivolous" lawsuits that, in their opinion, threaten to put an entire
industry out of business." Supporters of the bill express concerns that the potential bankrupting, or at least significant
damaging, of the U.S. gun industry would have other adverse
effects, including restricting the supply of weapons available to
the military. 10 Additionally, proponents of the bill argue that
the potential financial impact of litigation on the gun industry
could deprive individuals of their Second Amendment right to
keep and bear arms."' Proponents of the bill also articulate a
96. Id. § 2(5).
97. Id. § 3(a).
98. Id. § 4(5). The five exceptions are: (1) an action against a transferor
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(h); (2) an action for negligence per se or negligent entrustment; (3) an action in which the defendant knowingly and willfully violated a state or federal statute; (4) an action for breach of contract or
warranty; and (5) an action for injuries arising from a defect in design or
manufacture of a firearm when used as intended. Id. § 4; see also infra notes
138-159 and accompanying text (discussing the exceptions in greater detail).
99. E.g., 149 CONG. REC. H2972 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 2003) (statement of Rep.
John); id. S3998 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2003) (statement of Sen. Craig).
100. E.g., id. H2973 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 2003) (statement of Rep. Miller).
101. E.g., id. H2976 (statement of Rep. Otter); id. H2969 (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner). While this position is frequently asserted by supporters of
House Bill 1036, the exact nature of the right protected by the Second
Amendment is widely debated. See Anthony Gallia, Comment, "Your Weapons,
You Will Not Need Them": Comment on the Supreme Court's Sixty-Year Silence
on the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 33 AKRON L. REV. 131, 132-34 (1999).
The debate centers on whether the Second Amendment provides an individual
right or a collective right associated with the maintenance of a militia. Gallia,
supra, at 137-38. The existence of an individual right to own and use firearms
is far from settled. In fact, the Supreme Court, on the three occasions on which
it has considered the scope of the Second Amendment, has consistently held
that it pertains only to the right to bear arms within the context of a state mi-
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concern with a slippery slope of liability for manufacturers of a
wide array of goods which can injure or kill when misused, such
as automobiles.'
Further, the bill's supporters criticize lawsuits against the
gun industry as an attempt by the judiciary to craft gun control
laws outside of the legislative process.0 3 Imposing restrictions
on inherently dangerous products is a task for the legislature,
not the judiciary, so the argument goes.' Legal scholars opposed to lawsuits against the gun industry by victims of gun
violence have argued that judicial attempts to "regulate" the
firearms industry through punitive damages awards and in-

junctive relief violate the separation of powers. 105 Others assert
that the legislature is the appropriate forum for determining
gun industry liability because legislative action would represent a broader social consensus than can be obtained through

the judicial system.0 6
On the other side of the debate, opponents of the bill argue
that it provides unwarranted and unprecedented support for an
industry that is already exempt from many regulations. 017 Op-

ponents contend that the bill would deprive the gun industry of

litia, free from congressional infringement. See United States v. Miller, 307
U.S. 174, 178-79 (1939); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1886);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875); Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship:A Primer,76 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 3, 3 (2000). Further, a majority of federal courts have taken the position that the Second Amendment guarantees only the right of a state to maintain a militia. Gallia, supra, at 151.
102. E.g., 149 CONG. REC. H2974 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 2003) (statement of Rep.
King); see also Pontillo, supra note 17, at 1204-05.
103. E.g., 149 CONG. REC. H2971 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Boucher); Amanda B. Hill, Ready, Aim, Sue: The Impact of Recent Texas Legislation on Gun Manufacturer Liability, 31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1387, 1415-17
(2000); Pontillo, supra note 17, at 1199-1200.
104. Hill, supra note 103, at 1415-16.
105. Kimball & Olson, supra note 52, at 1303-04.
106. Andrew S. Cabana, Comment, Missing the Target: Municipal Litigation Against Handgun Manufacturers:An Abuse of the Civil Tort System, 9
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1127, 1168 (2001).
107. E.g., 149 CONG. REC. H2971 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Moran); id. H2975 (statement of Rep. Watt); Eva Ritchey, Bill to Give Gun Industry More Immunity Is Last Thing We Need, THE ASHEVILLE CITIZENTIMES, May 8, 2003, at 7A. For instance, the firearms industry is exempt from
the oversight of the Consumer Safety Protection Commission. John G. Culhane & Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Defining a ProperRole for Public Nuisance
Law in Municipal Suits Against Gun Sellers: Beyond Rhetoric and Expedience,
52 S.C. L. REV. 287, 303-05 (2001).
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any incentive to operate in a socially responsible manner.1 0 8 In

addition, they express concern that the bill would deny victims
of gun violence the right to have their day in court.0 9
House Bill 1036 is not the first of its kind to be introduced
in Congress. Two similar bills have been proposed within the
last five years. 11 The earlier bills contained provisions compa-

rable to the provisions of the bill currently pending. 11' In particular, the bill introduced in 1999 was strikingly similar to
House Bill 1036, although it contained fewer exceptions to the
gun industry's immunity from suit than does House Bill
1036.112 The number of cosponsors of these bills has been steadhas more supporters than
ily increasing, and House
113 Bill 1036

either of the prior bills.

The current bill has been making more rapid progress in

Congress than either of the preceding bills. Neither of the prior
bills reached a vote in either house." 4 In contrast, House Bill
1036 passed the House of Representatives in April of 2003 by a
significant majority. 1 15 Two Senate counterparts to House Bill
1036, Senate Bill 659 and Senate Bill 1806, are currently pending in the Senate." 6 As of January of 2004, Senate Bill 659 had
108. E.g., 149 CONG. REC. H2975 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Langevin); id. H2976 (statement of Rep. Waxman); Ritchey, supra note 107, at
7A; Brady Ctr. to Prevent Handgun Violence, H.R. 1036/S. 659 Is Dangerous
to Our Nation's Health, at http://www.gunlawsuits.org/immunity/hr1036.asp
(last visited Jan. 25, 2004).
109. E.g., 149 CONG. REC. H2971 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Moran); id. H2975 (statement of Rep. Emanuel); Philip Compton, Letters: A
Right to Recourse, TAMPA TRIBUNE, May 23, 2003, at 18; Jason Dearen, Calif
Jury Awards $50.9 Million in Accidental Shooting, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, May 12, 2003, at 4.
110. H.R. 2037, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2001); H.R. 1032, 106th Cong. (1st
Sess. 1999). This Note will not discuss these earlier bills in detail, as there is
enough overlap between the prior bills and House Bill 1036 that a complete
discussion of all three bills would be redundant.
111. H.R. 2037; H.R. 1032.
112. H.R. 1032.
113. House Bill 1036 has 252 cosponsors while the earlier versions, House
Bill 2037 and House Bill 1032, had 232 and 98 cosponsors respectively. 2003
Bill Tracking H.R. 1036; 2001 Bill Tracking H.R. 2037; 1999 Bill Tracking
H.R. 1032.
114. See 2001 Bill Tracking H.R. 2037; 1999 Bill Tracking H.R. 1032.
115. 149 CONG. REC. H2998-2999 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 2003). House Bill 1036
passed the House on April 9, 2003, by a vote of 285 to 140. Id.
116. See NRA Inst. for Legislative Action, Continue to Support S. 659/S.
1806, at http://www.nraila.org/CurrentLegislation/Read.aspx?ITNDrop=897
(Nov. 25, 2003). Another Senate version of the bill, Senate Bill 1805, was defeated on March 2, 2004, although not for lack of support of the gun industry
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fifty-five cosponsors." 7 President Bush will almost certainly
sign the bill into law if it passes the Senate.' 18 Even if the current bill does not pass the Senate, however, it is very likely that
a similar or identical bill will be introduced in future Congressional sessions since the bill has aggressive supporters lobbying
on its behalf."9 Furthermore, should the current bill fail to be
enacted, the constitutional issues, the practical implications,
and, most importantly, the policy considerations associated
with House Bill 1036 would persist in any similar future legislation. Consequently, a thorough analysis of House Bill 1036
has import regardless of whether this particular version of the
legislation is ultimately enacted.

II. ANALYSIS OF HOUSE BILL 1036
A. THE PROVISIONS OF HOUSE BILL 1036: A COMPARISON WITH
STATE LAWS

House Bill 1036, while in some ways similar to the state
laws, goes far beyond the vast majority of the state laws to preclude a much broader array of suits against the gun industry.
Nonetheless, House Bill 1036 is not simply a blanket prohibiimmunity provisions of the bill as originally drafted, which had fifty-five
cosponsors and was originally expected to pass. See Edward Epstein, Gun Liability Bill Dies in Senate, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 3, 2004, at A16, available at
http:
//www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2004/03/03/
MNGSN5CQTE1.DTL; supra note 13. Instead, the bill's defeat stemmed from
unrelated amendments added at the last minute, prompting the bill's sponsors
to call for the rejection of the amended version of the bill. See Epstein, supra.
117. Senator Daschle's support for the bill brought the number of
cosponsors to fifty-five. Hunting & Shooting Sports Leadership Symposium,
Remarks by Senate Democratic Leader Tom Daschle on the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (S. 659), at http://www.heritagefund.org/PDF/
Daschle_remarks.pdf (Sept. 24, 2003).
118. In fact, when he was governor of Texas, George W. Bush signed into
law the Texas statute barring suits by municipalities against the gun industry. See Hill, supra note 103, at 1427.
119. Gun rights activists, particularly the NRA, have vociferously supported this bill. See NRA Inst. for Legislative Action, Transforming Public Opposition to Reckless Lawsuits into Legislative Reality, at http://www.nraila.org/
CurrentLegislation/Read.aspx?ID=898 (Nov. 26, 2003). In addition, statements
made by the NRA's executive vice president and by the primary sponsor of the
Senate versions of House Bill 1036 following the defeat of Senate Bill 1805
leave no doubt that the bill's supporters intend to continue their push in Congress for gun industry immunity legislation. See Senate Kills Bill Protecting
Gun Makers, supra note 13; Letter from Wayne R. LaPierre, Jr., Executive
Vice President, NRA, to U.S. Senators (Mar. 2, 2004), at http://www.nraila.org/
CurrentLegislation/Read.aspx?ID=999.
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tion on suit-it contains several specifically enumerated exceptions to the ban on suits against the gun industry. 120 In prac-

tice, however, these exceptions would be of limited usefulness
to plaintiffs attempting to circumvent the obstacle posed by
House Bill 1036.121

1. The Prohibition on Suit
The most striking difference between House Bill 1036 and
the state laws dealing with gun industry liability is the broad
range of plaintiffs to which House Bill 1036 applies. While most
state laws only bar suits brought by political subdivisions of the
state, the prohibition on suit in House Bill 1036 applies to both
private parties and public entities. 22 Moreover, the public enti-

ties barred from suit by House Bill 1036 are not limited to political subdivisions of states, but also include the states themselves as well as the federal government. 123 In contrast, the
majority of the state laws
explicitly
reserve to the state the
124
•

right to sue the gun industry.'

Unlike these state laws, which

simply shift to the state and to private parties the right to sue

the gun industry, House Bill 1036 would severely restrict suits
against the gun industry across the board, providing the gun

industry
with much broader protection than do the state
125
laws.
House Bill 1036 also differs in scope from some state laws
in that it applies to actions brought against a wide spectrum of
participants in the gun industry, including manufacturers,
dealers, importers, distributors, and trade associations. 126 Not

120. See infra notes 138-59 and accompanying text.
121. See discussion infra Part III.A.
122. H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. § 4(3) (2003).
123. See id.
124. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-16-504 (Michie Supp. 2003); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-11-184(b)(2) (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4501 (Supp. 2002); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.045 (Michie Supp. 2003).
125. No state law affects the rights of as broad a spectrum of plaintiffs as
does House Bill 1036 because the state laws cannot limit the right of the federal government to bring suit. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, even those
state laws which bar actions by the state, its subdivisions, and private parties
do not affect as many potential plaintiffs as does House Bill 1036. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.155 (Michie 2002).
126. H.R. 1036 § 4. Trade associations are defined as "any association or
business organization ... that is not operated for profit, and 2 or more members of which are manufacturers or sellers of a qualified product." Id. § 4(a).
An amendment was proposed in the House that would have scaled back
the scope of House Bill 1036 and rendered it applicable only to manufacturers
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all state laws are as broad in their application. For instance,
Maine's law only bars actions against firearm or ammunition
manufacturers but says nothing 12about
suits against dealers,
7
distributors, or trade associations.
Another noteworthy aspect of House Bill 1036 is its application to currently pending actions. The bill provides for the
immediate dismissal of any prohibited action pending on the
date of enactment. 2 ' Only four of the state laws also contain
similar retroactive application provisions." 9
A more minor difference lies in the fact that House Bill
1036 was drafted pursuant to Congress's power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. 130 Consequently, the bill applies
only to firearms and ammunition that have "been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce" and to manufacturers and sellers who are engaged in manufacturing or selling
in interstate or foreign commerce. 1 In theory, this scope is
narrower than that of the state laws, which apply to manufacturers and dealers who operate in intrastate as well as interstate commerce." 32 In reality, however, this distinction is illusory, as the gun industry, like most industries today, is
national in scope."3
There are also substantial differences between House Bill
1036 and many of the state laws in regards to the causes of action that are barred. House Bill 1036 begins by prohibiting actions for damages arising out of the "criminal or unlawful mis-

of firearms and ammunition. 149 CONG. REC. H2991 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 2003).
The amendment was not adopted. Id. H2994.
127. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 2005 (West Supp. 2003). But see ALA.
CODE § 11-80-11 (Supp. 2003) (applying its restrictions to suits brought
against manufacturers, dealers, and trade associations).
128. H.R. 1036 § 3(b).
129. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.435(13) (West Supp. 2003); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 21.750 (Supp. 2003); Act of Feb. 9, 1999, No. 4 § 3, 1999 Ga. Laws
2, 3; Act of June 11, 1999, No. 291, 1999 La. Acts 1168, 1169.
130. See H.R. 1036 § 2 (making repeated reference to interstate and foreign
commerce).
131. Id. § 4.
132. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.155 (Michie 2002) (drawing no distinction between gun manufacturers engaged in interstate versus intrastate commerce); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-184 (2003) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-0354 (Supp. 2003) (same).
133. It strains the imagination to envision a suit against a gun manufacturer or dealer that would be permissible under House Bill 1036 simply because the defendant was engaged solely in intrastate commerce and the firearm in question had never moved in interstate commerce.
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use" of a firearm.14 Most of the state laws contain a somewhat
different formulation of the prohibited causes of action, typically barring suits "resulting from or relating to the lawful design, manufacture, distribution or sale of firearms."'35 From this
language alone, the state laws appear to prohibit more causes
of action than House Bill 1036 since the language of the state
laws precludes suits arising from the lawful use of a firearm as
well as suits arising from its unlawful use, as long as the
manufacture or sale itself was lawful. Many of the state laws,
however, carve out exceptions to the prohibition on suit for defective design and breach of warranty claims, both typically associated with lawful use, thus bringing the range of causes of
action barred closer to par with House Bill 1036.

134. H.R. 1036 § 4(5).
135. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-67(1) (Supp. 2003); see also ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 14-16-504 (Supp. 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-184(b)(2); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-4501 (Supp. 2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.045 (Michie Supp. 2003).
Two state laws, however, contain very similar language to House Bill
1036. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-714 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:21
(Supp. 2004). The Arizona law is nearly identical in structure and content to
House Bill 1036, although it contains only one of the five exceptions listed in
the federal bill to the prohibition on suit. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-714. Overall,
however, the Arizona law is much narrower in its application because it applies only to political subdivisions of the state. Id.
The recently enacted New Hampshire law also utilizes the same structure
and content as House Bill 1036. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:21. Like the
Arizona law, New Hampshire's statute contains only one exception to the prohibition on suit. Id. Unlike the Arizona law, however, the New Hampshire law
applies to public as well as private plaintiffs, rendering it one of the most restrictive of all the state laws, arguably more restrictive than House Bill 1036.
Id.
136. For example, under this language, a municipality would be barred
from suing for injuries to a police officer whose gun malfunctioned while firing.
Most state laws, however, contain an exception for a defective design cause of
action in order to permit cases such as this to proceed. See infra note 137 and
accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4501(b); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 28.435(10) (Supp. 2003); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-67(1); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-03-54; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 128.001(d) (Vernon Supp.
2003). Thus, a plaintiff who was injured by a lawfully employed, but malfunctioning, firearm would be able to sue the gun industry for defective design or
breach of warranty under most state laws. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 604501; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.435; MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-67; N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-03-54; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 128.001. Some
of the state laws permit a defective design suit even if the use of the firearm
that caused the injury was unlawful. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4501;
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 128.001.
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Exceptions to the Prohibition on Suit

House Bill 1036 contains five specifically enumerated exceptions to the overarching prohibition on suit for injuries arising from the unlawful use of firearms. 138 These exceptions differ
from the provisions of most of the state laws and, given their
significance to plaintiffs, warrant close attention.
The first exception permits an action instituted against a
transferor of firearms already convicted under 18 U.S.C
§ 924(h), or a similar state felony law, as long as the action is
brought "by a party directly harmed by the conduct of which
the transferee is so convicted." 3 9 Section 924(h) of title 18 provides penalties for an individual who "knowingly transfers a
firearm, knowing that such firearm will be used to commit a
crime of violence ... or a drug trafficking crime . ."140
Most of
the state laws do not contain a comparable exception.14 The exception, however, is very limited due to the requirement that
the transferor
4 must first be convicted of this felony in order to
permit suit.' '
The second exception to the prohibition on suit permits "an
action brought against a seller for negligent entrustment or
negligence per se."143 Negligence per se is not defined in the bill
but is generally understood as negligence arising from a statutory violation. The bill defines negligent entrustment as the
supplying of a firearm or ammunition to a person when the
seller knows or should know that the person is likely to use the
product "in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical
138. H.R. 1036 § 4(5)(A)(i).
139. Id.
140. 18 U.S.C. § 924(h) (2000).
141. See supra notes 64-79 and accompanying text (discussing the provisions of state laws barring suits against the gun industry).
142. An amendment was proposed in the House to remove the requirement
that the transferor be convicted before being susceptible to suit. 149 CONG.
REC. H2982 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 2003) (statement of Rep. Scott). The amendment
was not adopted. Id. H2995. Another amendment was proposed to add a sixth
exception that would permit suit against a transferor convicted under 18
U.S.C. § 922(d), which makes it a federal crime to transfer firearms to a person whom the transferor has reason to believe is a user of a controlled substance. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d); see also 149 CONG. REC. H2984 (daily ed. Apr. 9,
2003). This amendment also was rejected by vote. 149 CONG. REC. H2995
(daily ed. Apr. 9, 2003).
143. H.R. 1036 § 4(5)(A)(ii). An amendment to include an exception for general common law negligence was proposed and rejected. 149 CONG. REC.
H2987, 2995-96 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 2003).
144. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1057 (7th ed. 1999).
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injury to the person and others," and the person does in fact so
use the product. 5 This definition seriously restricts the scope
of the exception. In suits instituted by victims of gun violence,
plaintiffs frequently allege that the gun industry's practices facilitate "straw purchases" in which an eligible purchaser buys a
firearm for an ineligible purchaser who then uses the firearm
illegally, harming the plaintiff.146 In such cases, the shooter did
not obtain the firearm directly from the dealer. A negligent entrustment claim, therefore, could not be brought against such a
dealer because it was not the actual purchaser who injured the
plaintiff. Further, under this formulation, a negligent entrustment claim may be brought only against a seller of a firearm,
not against a manufacturer. 147 Of all of the state laws, only Virginia's contains a similar exception. 48
The third exception to the prohibition on suit in House Bill
1036 allows an action against a manufacturer or seller who
"knowingly and willfully" violates a state or federal law applicable to the sale or marketing of firearms or ammunition. 149 In
addition, the violation must be "the proximate cause of the
harm for which relief is sought."' None of the state laws contains a comparable exception. This exception too has limited
application because of the high mens5 rea requirement of "knowingly and willfully" that it imposes.'
The fourth exception permits an action for breach of con53
tract
or provision.
breach of warranty.
Many of the state laws contain a
similar
"14 This exception, however, is unlikely to be

145. H.R. 1036 § 4(5)(B).
146. See, e.g., Compl. at 25-26, City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.
(Ohio Ct. C.P. Hamilton County Apr. 28, 1999) (No. A9902369).
147. H.R. 1036 § 4.
148. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-915.1 (2003). The negligence exception in Virginia's law is broader than that in House Bill 1036, permitting an "action for
injuries resulting from negligence." Id. This exception renders Virginia's prohibition on suit fairly limited, as negligence is a popular claim for plaintiffs in
suits against the gun industry. See supra notes 16-63 and accompanying text.
149. H.R. 1036 § 4(5)(A)(iii).
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
152. H.R. 1036 § 4(5)(A)(iii).
153. Id. § 4(5)(A)(iv).
154. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-80-11 (Supp. 2003); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 14-16-504 (Michie Supp. 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.331 (West Supp.
2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-184 (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4501 (Supp.
2002); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.045 (Michie Supp. 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1799 (West 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 2005 (West Supp.
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used since plaintiffs in suits against the gun industry rarely
have facts that would support a breach of contract or breach of
warranty claim. 55
The final exception in House Bill 1036 permits an action
for damages "resulting directly from a defect in design or
manufacture of the product, when used as intended."5 6 This exception has the potential to be quite broad as it seemingly permits products liability actions against the gun industry. The
qualification "when used as intended," however, severely limits
the usefulness of this exception. A court could conclude that the
"used as intended" requirement excludes any suit arising from
the criminal use of a firearm, because firearms are not intended for illegal use. 15 In contrast, while many of the state
laws explicitly permit products liability actions arising from defective design or manufacture, the state laws typically do not
contain a "when used as intended" requirement. 5
Due to the five exceptions to the prohibition on suit and the
narrower starting premise of suits arising from "criminal or
unlawful misuse," House Bill 1036 initially appears to bar
fewer causes of action than do the state laws. However, the nationwide applicability of House Bill 1036 and the fact that it
encompasses an extremely wide range of potential plaintiffs
and defendants ensure that House Bill 1036 would affect many
more litigants than the state laws. Further, the limited usefulness of the
"exceptions" renders the bill broader than it first
159
appears.

2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-67 (Supp. 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 12.107

(Michie Supp. 2003).
155. See supra notes 16-63 and accompanying text (discussing the common
causes of action alleged in suits against the gun industry).
156. H.R. 1036 § 4(5)(A)(v).
157. See infra notes 205-13 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of the potential problems with the "when used as intended" language.
This exception would have very limited application in most suits arising from
criminal shootings because the plaintiffs in those suits typically cannot demonstrate a defect in the firearm-on the contrary, the firearm causing their
injuries functioned all too well.
158. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.155 (Michie 2002); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 11-1-67; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-54 (Supp. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 21-58-1 to -4 (Supp. 2003). But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.60 (West
Supp. 2004) (precluding gun industry liability for "any action of any person
who uses a firearm in a manner which is unlawful, negligent, or otherwise inconsistent with the purposesfor which it was intended" (emphasis added)).
159. See discussion infra Part III.A (examining the limited effect that the
exceptions would have on currently pending lawsuits).
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B. LEGAL SHORTCOMINGS OF HOUSE BILL 1036

House Bill 1036 suffers from several potential legal deficiencies. Some of these issues relate to constitutionality, while
others stem from vagueness concerns.
1.

1
Constitutional Concerns

61

One constitutional hurdle that House Bill 1036 would face62
if enacted is the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The retroactive application of House Bill 1036 could implicate
due process concerns by depriving litigants of a vested right to
pursue a cause of action that has already been instituted. 163 The
U.S. Supreme Court has held that a "cause of action is a species
of property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause" in certain situations, 64 a holding that could be
applied to the Fifth Amendment as well. Federal circuit courts,
on the other hand, have repeatedly held that "a legal claim affords no definite or enforcible [sic] property right until reduced
to a final judgment." 6 '
The decisions in the circuit courts came in connection with
the Federal Employees' Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (FELRTCA), a federal law aimed at limiting
plaintiffs' ability to recover for tort claims against federal employees acting within the scope of their employment."' Three
160. A detailed analysis of each of these issues could fill an entire book and
consequently is beyond the scope of this Note. The constitutional issues in particular, however, would provide fruitful ground for future scholarship.
161. Plaintiffs in suits against the gun industry have raised some of the
same constitutionality issues in regards to state laws dealing with gun industry liability. See supra notes 84 and 87 and accompanying text. For a fairly detailed analysis of the constitutional issues raised by the state laws, see Vernick & Mair, supra note 23, at 144-46. Certain hurdles faced by the state laws
would not be implicated by the federal bill since it will not have to contend
with the restrictions imposed by state constitutions.
162.

U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall any person.., be deprived of life,

liberty, or property without due process of law.").
163. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
164. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982).
165. Sowell v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 888 F.2d 802, 805 (11th Cir. 1989); see
also Salmon v. Schwarz, 948 F.2d 1131, 1143 (10th Cir. 1991); Arbour v. Jenkins, 903 F.2d 416, 420 (6th Cir. 1990).
166. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2000); see also Perry H. Apelbaum & Samara T. Ryder, The Third Wave of Federal Tort Reform: Protecting the Public or Pushing
the Constitutional Envelope?, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 591, 611-12
(1999). The law provides that tort claims against federal employees must be
brought against the federal government rather than against the individual
employee. 28 U.S.C. § 2679. FELRTCA, therefore, is similar to House Bill
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circuit courts rejected the argument by various plaintiffs that
the retroactive application of FELRTCA violated the Due Process Clause, noting that the plaintiffs' pending claims were not a
property right.167 A plaintiff challenging the retroactive application of House Bill 1036 would have to overcome this precedent.
To do so, a plaintiff challenging the retroactive application
of House Bill 1036 as a violation of due process could attempt to
distinguish it from FELRTCA by emphasizing the fact that
House Bill 1036 wholly eliminates a plaintiffs ability to sue in
certain situations, while FELRTCA simply requires injured
parties to sue a different defendant. 6 ' A plaintiff could argue
that, while the retroactive application of FELRTCA does not
violate due process, the retroactive application of House Bill
1036 does indeed violate due process because it is much more
severe, terminating a plaintiffs ability to sue the gun industry
without providing any alternative defendant.'69 However, even
if a court considering a due process challenge to House Bill
1036 were to conclude that a Fifth Amendment property interest is implicated due to the bill's extremely harsh consequences
for injured parties, the court would apply only the lenient "rational basis test" in ascertaining the bill's constitutionality,
making it unlikely that the plaintiff would prevail.7
While municipal plaintiffs have raised due process claims
in regards to certain state laws barring their suits against the
gun industry, the reasoning in those cases would not be applicable to a private party's challenge to House Bill 1036. Municipal plaintiffs have contested the retroactive application of the
71
Louisiana and Michigan laws limiting gun industry liability.
The courts in both cases rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, noting that the due process guarantees of the U.S. Constitution do
not apply to political subdivisions of the state. 172 This reasoning
would not be relevant to a due process challenge to House Bill
1036 by a private party deprived of his right to sue.
House Bill 1036 also calls into question the constitutional1036 in that it too is a federal law that restricts plaintiffs' ability to sue certain parties. See id.
167. Salmon, 948 F.2d at 1143; Arbour, 903 F.2d at 420; Sowell, 888 F.2d
at 805; see also supra note 165 and accompanying text.
168. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2679, with H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003).
169. See H.R. 1036 § 4.
170. See Apelbaum & Ryder, supra note 166, at 644-45.
171. Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1, 8 (La. 2001); Mayor of
Detroit v. Arms Tech., Inc., 669 N.W.2d 845, 856 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
172. Morial, 785 So. 2d at 11; Mayor of Detroit, 669 N.W.2d at 855-58.
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ity of a law that completely abrogates a cause of action without
173
providing any compensating legal benefits to injured parties.
The Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on the issue of
whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires a "legislative quid pro quo" in regards to a law that restricts an individual's common law rights, as does House Bill
1036.'4 In dicta, however, the Supreme Court has expressed
skepticism that such a constitutional requirement exists.15
These comments suggest that the success of a due process challenge to House Bill 1036 would be doubtful. Nonetheless, this
dicta has not been translated into a definitive ruling in regards
to any one of the handful of existing federal "tort reform" laws
that entirely deprive a plaintiff of his right to bring a particular
suit,116 since none of these laws has yet been the subject of a
due process challenge, leaving some leeway for a plaintiff to
challenge House Bill 1036.
It is also conceivable that a court considering a due process
challenge to House Bill 1036 would conclude that while neither
the retroactive application provision nor the bill's complete nullification of a plaintiffs cause of action alone violates due process, the combined effect of these two aspects of House Bill 1036
unreasonably infringes on due process rights. For example, a
plaintiff with a jury verdict against a gun industry defendant
for which a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is
pending would not only have the jury award retroactively
stripped away by passage of House Bill 1036, but would also be
denied any further method of obtaining redress for injuries that
a jury concluded were caused by members of the gun industry. 77 The due process implications of a federal "tort reform"
173. See Apelbaum & Ryder, supra note 166, at 659.
174. Id.
175. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88
(1978) ("[It is not at all clear that the Due Process Clause in fact requires that
a legislatively enacted compensation scheme either duplicate the recovery at
common law or provide a reasonable substitute remedy."); see also Apelbaum
& Ryder, supra note 166, at 659.
176. E.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1606 (2000) (prohibiting suits against suppliers of materials for medical devices); 42 U.S.C. § 1791 (2000) (prohibiting suits
against nonprofit organizations that supply donated food to needy individuals
as well as against many suppliers of that food); id. §§ 14501-14505 (granting
liability protection for volunteers).
177. The jury verdict in this hypothetical does not constitute a final judgment, and thus a vested property interest, because it is still reviewable. See
Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1986) ("[R]ights in tort do
not vest until there is a final, unreviewable judgment.").
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law that presents both of these characteristics have not yet
been considered by a court.
House Bill 1036 would also be vulnerable to a challenge
under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. 17 ' A plaintiff precluded from suing the gun industry by
House Bill 1036 could argue that she is being singled out for
negative treatment solely because her injuries stem from a different type of product than those of another plaintiff with similar injuries. Such a challenge likely would be reviewed under
the deferential "rational basis test," since House Bill 1036
seemingly involves no "suspect class" or "fundamental right"
179
review.
heightened standardofof
necessitate areview
that wouldrational
review that
is the standard
basis
Moreover,

178. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause incorporates an equal protection component).
179. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) ("[U]nless a classification warrants some form of heightened review because it jeopardizes exercise
of a fundamental right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect
characteristic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification rationally further a legitimate state interest.").
While the Supreme Court has held that there exists a "fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts," Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828
(1977), cases addressing this right have typically centered on the rights of indigent individuals to defend themselves against criminal charges, in spite of
their financial situation. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58
(1963) (finding a constitutional right for an indigent criminal defendant to
have counsel on an initial appeal of his case); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 344-45 (1963) (holding that indigent defendants in a criminal matter
have a constitutional right to be provided with legal counsel by the state).
Courts have not identified a broader general constitutional "right to sue." See,
e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1973) (upholding, on rational
basis review, a filing fee that prevented a welfare recipient from filing a suit to
seek review of an adverse welfare decision). Consequently, the fundamental
right to access the courts is not implicated by House Bill 1036, and the bill
would likely be subject to rational basis review. A plaintiff barred from suing
the gun industry by House Bill 1036 could argue for an acknowledgment of a
more general constitutional right to seek legal redress for injuries caused by
another. However, the Supreme Court has expressed reluctance to expand the
category of fundamental rights. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30-35 (1973).
If a court were to conclude that House Bill 1036 infringes on a fundamental right, the court would apply strict scrutiny to the bill. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) ("[Eiqual protection analysis requires strict
scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right."). Strict scrutiny review requires that the law be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest in order to be upheld as constitutional. Abrams v. Johnson, 521
U.S. 74, 91 (1997). If this exacting standard were applied to House Bill 1036, a
plaintiff would have a good chance of having it declared unconstitutional.
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has typically been applied to constitutional challenges to federal tort reforms.18°
Rational basis review would pose a significant hurdle for
plaintiffs challenging House Bill 1036. Rational basis review
requires only that the law be "rationally related to a legitimate
state interest." 1" Successfully challenging a law that is subject
merely to rational basis review is no small feat, since any conceivable legitimate purpose for the law will suffice to uphold its
constitutionality. 8 2 For instance, a court could conclude that
House Bill 1036 is reasonably related to the purpose of protecting the firearms industry, which is necessary in order to
8 3 arm
the nation's police forces and maintain national security.'
In addition, House Bill 1036 poses a potential problem regarding its interaction with current state laws dealing with
suits against the gun industry. By dint of the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal laws preempt state
laws when the two come into conflict. 184 Preemption can be either explicit or implied by congressional intent.' House Bill
1036 does not contain an explicit preemption clause nor does it
address how it would interact with state laws that apply
stricter limitations on suits against the gun industry. 86 Other
federal tort reform laws contain
explicit provisions pertaining
87
to these preemption issues.

While most of the state laws impose fewer restrictions on
180. See Apelbaum & Ryder, supra note 166, at 644; Vernick & Mair, supra
note 23, at 145-46. Congress in the past has enacted "tort reform" laws that
apply only to a particular industry, yet none of these laws has been challenged
as a violation of equal protection. Vernick & Mair, supra note 23, at 145 (discussing the General Aviation Revitalization Act).
181. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
182. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993)
(noting that rational basis review is a "paradigm ofjudicial restraint" and that
a statute subjected to rational basis review comes to the court "bearing a
strong presumption of validity").
183. This argument has actually been advanced by proponents of House
Bill 1036 as a reason for supporting its passage. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
184. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (declaring that federal laws "shall be the supreme Law of the Land").
185. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 304 (Aspen Law & Business ed., 2001).
186. H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. (2003).
187. E.g., General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. § 40101
(2001) ("This section supersedes any State law to the extent that such law
permits a civil action described in subsection (a) to be brought after the applicable limitation period for such civil action. .. ").
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suits than does the proposed federal law, a provision detailing
House Bill 1036's interaction with state laws would still be useful in regards to those few state laws that are more stringent
than the proposed federal law, as well as state laws that may
be passed in the future. For a concrete example, consider the
New Hampshire law limiting lawsuits against the gun industry.188 The New Hampshire law prohibits a broader array of
causes of action than does House Bill 1036. While it begins with
the same foundational language as House Bill 1036, barring
suit for damages resulting from criminal or unlawful use of a
firearm, it contains only one exception to the prohibition on
suit, for actions brought against a gun industry defendant already convicted of a felony.'89 Would a victim of a criminal
shooting who brings a suit in New Hampshire for negligent entrustment against gun industry defendants be barred from doing so by the New Hampshire law, or would House Bill 1036
preempt the New Hampshire law and permit the suit under the
second exception to the prohibition on suit?9 ° Since House Bill
1036 lacks an explicit preemption clause, the doctrine of implied preemption must be applied to determine whether it preempts state laws.'91
The Supreme Court has articulated two forms of implied
preemption. One is field preemption, where the federal regulation is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it." 92 The
other is conflict preemption, where the state law "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
Both types of preemption would be applicable to the hypothetical posited above, yet they seemingly yield different results. The length and detail of House Bill 1036 strongly suggests that Congress intended to occupy the field of gun industry
liability and did not aim to leave room for differing state

188. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:21 (2003).
189. Id.; see also supra note 135.
190. H.R. 1036 § 4 (permitting suits for negligence per se and negligent entrustment in certain situations).
191. H.R. 1036; see also Rector v. Labone, Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 987, 990
(E.D. Ark. 2002).
192. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also
Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
193. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)).
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laws.' 94 Thus, field preemption analysis indicates that House
Bill 1036 would control over a more stringent state law, and the
plaintiff in the hypothetical would be able to sue for negligent
entrustment. On the other hand, the objective of Congress in
passing House Bill 1036 was to protect the gun industry from
what Congress considers to be frivolous lawsuits.9 Since the
New Hampshire law provides the firearms industry with even
more protection from liability, it appears to further congressional goals.1 96 Conflict preemption analysis may therefore require that more stringent state laws prevail, and the fictitious
plaintiff above would be barred from suing under the New
Hampshire law. Without an express preemption provision, the
interaction of House Bill 1036 with more stringent state laws is
therefore unclear.
Finally, House Bill 1036 also raises federalism concerns
regarding its potential infringement on an area of traditional
state regulation. 97 The existence of numerous state laws addressing gun industry liability reveals that litigation against
the gun industry has been largely regulated by the states.' 98
House Bill 1036 thus would be susceptible to a challenge that it
is an unconstitutional infringement by the federal government
on the ability of states to regulate an area of law that they have
heretofore been free to control. It is unlikely, however, that
such federalism concerns would induce a court to invalidate
House Bill 1036, since "[clourts have previously not been accommodating of Tenth Amendment federalism concerns in the
context of federal tort reform laws."'99 Current Tenth Amendment doctrine requires that a federal law actively commandeer
the state's legislative process in order to be found to violate the
Tenth Amendment. 20 0 The provisions of House Bill 1036 do not
194. See supra Part II.A (describing the provisions of House Bill 1036).
195. H.R. 1036 § 2.
196. The conflict preemption argument could also cut the other way: Congress, in defining the causes of action barred by House Bill 1036 as it did,
specified the full array of lawsuits that Congress deems "frivolous" and from
which the gun industry warrants protection. If the New Hampshire law bars

suits outside of this defined range, it indeed poses an obstacle to the fulfillment of the purpose behind House Bill 1036 by prohibiting suits from which

Congress did not conclude that the gun industry deserves protection.
197. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
198. See supra Part I.B.
199. Apelbaum & Ryder, supra note 166, at 653 (footnote omitted).
200. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997) ("[Tlhe Federal
Government may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs."); New York v. United States, 505
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compel or coerce a state legislature into adopting a particular
regulatory program. 20 1 Thus, a court would have to be willing to
expand on current Tenth Amendment doctrine in order to invalidate House Bill 1036 on Tenth Amendment grounds.0 2
2.

Vagueness Concerns

Aside from the constitutional issues, the vagueness of two
of House Bill 1036's most important provisions also gives cause
for concern. The phrase "when used as intended," found in the
fifth exception to the prohibition on suit, is not defined anywhere in the bill.202 The exception, permitting certain products

liability actions, could be either quite narrow or quite broad depending on the construction given to that phrase, making the
absence of a definition especially unfortunate. 20 4
In particular, the interpretation of the exception turns on
whether "when used as intended" includes a reasonable fore-

seeability component.2 0 If "when used as intended" is construed
to include the reasonably foreseeable use of a firearm, products
liability suits arising from the criminal use of a firearm would

likely be permitted under the fifth exception since it is arguably
foreseeable that a firearm would be used criminally. 206 If, on the
other hand, no "reasonably foreseeable" component exists, gun

industry defendants could argue that the fifth exception in
U.S. 144, 161 (1992).

201. H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. (2003).
202. See Apelbaum & Ryder, supra note 166, at 653-54.
203. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text. The fifth exception
permits suits for damages "resulting directly from a defect in design or manufacture of the product, when used as intended." H.R. 1036 § 4.
204. Representative Watt, who proposed that the language "when used as
intended" be removed from the bill, noted that the failure of the bill to define
this phrase left serious doubt as to the scope of the fifth exception. 149 CONG.
REC. H2979 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 2003).
205. Under the proposed Daschle-Craig-Baucus amendments to Senate Bill
659, embodied in the now-defeated Senate Bill 1805, products liability suits
arising from the criminal use of firearms would not be permitted despite the
recognition of a reasonable foreseeability component. While Senate Bill 1805
specifically included a reasonable foreseeability element, the bill provided that
"reasonably foreseeable," for purposes of the fifth exception, "does not include
any criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified product, other than possessory
offenses." S. 1805, 108th Cong. (2003). Thus, although Senate Bill 1805 clarified this exception, it significantly limited its usefulness.
206. See James v. Arms Tech., Inc., 820 A.2d 27, 47 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2003) (noting that the plaintiffs' injuries were reasonably foreseeable to
the gun industry defendants because "the dangerous propensity of handguns
is self-evident and the consequence of their misuse is well documented").
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House Bill 1036 does not permit suits arising from the criminal
use of firearms because firearms are not intended for criminal
use.
Precedent provides no clear answer to this question, as
courts are divided over the issue. 2 " A recent case from the
Eleventh Circuit highlights this split. In Jennings v. Bic, Inc.,
the Eleventh Circuit considered whether a cigarette lighter
manufacturer could be held liable on a products liability theory
for damages caused when a three-year-old obtained a lighter
and set his brother's clothing on fire.208 The court noted that
products liability applies only when the product is used as intended. 2 0 9 The court reasoned that since lighters are not intended for use as children's playthings, the manufacturer could
not be held liable. 210 The dissent vigorously contested this conclusion, arguing that the majority failed to consider that "intended use" incorporates a reasonable foreseeability element.211
The dissent argued that, by application of a reasonable foreseeability component, the defendant should be held liable because
"the very statistics cited by the majority regarding the annual
number of deaths caused by children playing with lighters support the conclusion that the child's use of the lighter was reasonably foreseeable."" 2 Such divergent positions as those taken
by the majority and the dissent in the Jennings case could
dramatically affect the import of the fifth exception in House

207. Compare Jennings v. Bic, Inc., 181 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 1999) (failing
to consider a reasonable foreseeablility component to the notion of "intended
use"), and Monaco v. Red Fox Gun Club, Inc., No. 2000-P-0064, 2001 Ohio
App. LEXIS 6008, at *14-15 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2001) (discussing a firearm's "intended use" without reference to reasonable foreseeability), with
Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 125 (Cal. 2001) (noting that a product
can be defective under a products liability theory if "'the product has failed to
perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonablyforeseeable manner" (quoting Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co.,
573 P.2d 443, 452 (Cal. 1978)) (emphasis added)), and Cobb v. Insured Lloyds,
387 So. 2d 13, 17-18 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (discussing intended or normal use in
the context of reasonably foreseeable use).
208. Jennings, 181 F.3d at 1253.
209. Id. at 1256.
210. Id. Adapting this logic to firearms litigation, a court could conclude
that firearms are not intended to be used unlawfully to shoot people, thus limiting dramatically the scope of the fifth exception in House Bill 1036. This argument is tenuous, however, since the purpose of a firearm is undoubtedly to
shoot things-targets, animals, and, if necessary, people.
211. Id. at 1261 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
212. Id.
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Bill 1036.213
In addition, the critical phrase "criminal or unlawful misuse," key to understanding what constitutes a prohibited action, is not defined in House Bill 1036.114 It is unclear whether
conduct that is merely civilly negligent qualifies as "unlawful
misuse," thereby falling within the ambit of the bill's prohibition on suit. 2 5 The failure of the bill to define these crucial
phrases leaves serious doubt regarding its actual scope.216
The interplay between the "unlawful misuse" requirement
and the fifth exception in House Bill 1036 is another gray area
in the bill. While the bill bars suits arising from the "criminal
or unlawful misuse" of a firearm, the fifth exception permits
products liability suits when the injury results from the use of
the firearm "when used as intended."2 17 However, if "unlawful
misuse" does not include mere negligent misuse and if "when
used as intended" excludes the criminal use of a firearm, what
purpose does this fifth "exception" serve? If suits arising from
the negligent misuse of firearms are not affected by the general
213. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
214. H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. (2003) (defining a qualified civil liability action as any action brought against a gun industry defendant for "damages [or
injunctive relief] resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified
product by the person or a third party").
215. Senate Bill 1805, encompassing the Daschle-Craig-Baucus amendments to Senate Bill 659, contained a definition of "unlawful misuse" that explicitly excluded negligent misuse. S. 1805, 108th Cong. (2003). Thus, a suit
based on the civilly negligent use of a firearm would not be barred by the bill.
Id. Such an alteration to House Bill 1036, however, would still not allow any
currently pending case, which otherwise would be barred by the bill, to go forward because most suits by victims of gun violence involve conduct by the
shooter that is more than merely civilly negligent. See supra Part I.A.
216. State laws dealing with gun industry liability offer little guidance in
addressing these vagueness concerns. While Louisiana's products liability law
refers to the notion of intended use, providing that no manufacturer or dealer
who has complied with state and federal laws can be held liable for "any action
of any person who uses a firearm in a manner which is unlawful, negligent, or
otherwise inconsistent with the purposes for which it was intended," the law
leaves no doubt that both criminal and negligent use are excluded as a basis
for suit. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800 (West Supp. 2004). No other state law
dealing with gun industry liability makes reference to "intended use." See supra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
Additionally, only three of the state laws refer to "criminal or unlawful
misuse." See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-714 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-12-3-1 to -5 (Michie Supp. 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:21 (2003).
These laws do not shed light on House Bill 1036, however, because none of
them contains a definition of the phrase nor has the issue been litigated in regards to these laws.
217. H.R. 1036.
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prohibition on suits arising from "criminal or unlawful misuse,"
what sorts of cases would the fifth "exception" permit that otherwise would have been barred by the bill?
House Bill 1036 suffers from numerous legal shortcomings,
ranging from constitutional issues to serious vagueness concerns, leaving litigants uncertain as to the bill's actual import.
Nonetheless, the bill, if enacted, would have significant nationwide ramifications in the area of gun industry litigation.
Whether they understood the bill or not, plaintiffs would undoubtedly feel its presence.
III. THE IMPACT OF HOUSE BILL 1036
A. THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF HOUSE BILL 1036

House Bill 1036, if enacted, would have a tremendous impact on litigation against the gun industry. While state laws
dealing with gun industry liability have already affected suits
in several states, the reach of the proposed federal law would
be even greater. House Bill 1036 would dismiss many suits that
are currently proceeding unhampered by state laws. These
suits are not without legal merit, as evidenced by the fact that
many have survived motions to dismiss.21 On the contrary,
they seek to hold a powerful industry responsible for its sometimes egregious misconduct. 19 Given the power wielded by the
gun rights lobby in Congress, the courts are one of the few remaining forums for individuals seeking to hold the gun industry accountable
for its conduct, underscoring the importance of
220
these suits.
Significantly, House Bill 1036 would affect suits in the approximately twenty states that do not have gun industry immunity laws. In addition, the bill would bar suits instituted by
private parties, which are unaffected by most of the state
laws. 22' Further, the proposed legislation would bar suits by the
states themselves.222
Concrete examples of the impact that House Bill 1036
would have on currently pending lawsuits are useful in ascertaining the true reach of the proposed law. For instance, House
218. See cases cited supra note 50.
219. See supra notes 38 and 54 and accompanying text.
220. See Lytton, supra note 7, at 1251.
221. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
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Bill 1036 would stop the landmark Chicago lawsuit dead in its
tracks.223 Since the suit alleges injuries arising out of the criminal misuse of firearms, it would fall within the ambit of the
bill's prohibition.22 4 None of the exceptions in House Bill 1036
would save Chicago's public nuisance claims. The city does not
allege any statutory violations, nor have the defendants been
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(h), thus rendering the first and
third exceptions unavailable to the plaintiff.2 5 In addition, the
city has not alleged
negligent
entrustment, making the second
• iI 226
exception inapplicable. Likewise, the fourth and fifth exceptions are inapplicable to the public nuisance claims because
those exceptions
only227with breach of contract or products
liablitycaues odealJ"
liability causes of action. Thus, despite the Illinois Court of
Appeals ruling that the city has properly stated a claim for
public nuisance under well-established common law principles,
the proposed federal legislation would deprive the city of the
opportunity to present its case to a jury.228
As evidenced by the example of the Chicago suit, House
Bill 1036 essentially provides that members of the gun industry
who have not violated a state or federal law are incapable of
creating or contributing to the public nuisance of gun violence.229 Without a statutory violation, the first and third exceptions of House Bill 1036 are inapplicable. 20 The second, fourth,
and fifth exceptions do nothing to save a public nuisance cause
of action because they explicitly permit
231 only negligence, breach
of contract, or products liability suits.

223.

City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 785 N.E.2d 16 (Ill.
App. Ct.

2002); see also supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
224. See H.R. 1036 § 4.
225. See supra notes 139-42 and 149-52 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
228. City of Chicago, 785 N.E.2d at 31. For these same reasons, House Bill

1036 would also cut short the NAACP's appeal of the dismissal of its public
nuisance suit against the gun industry. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
229. This proposition flatly contradicts established common law doctrine,
which does not require a statutory violation as a prerequisite to a public nuisance. See David Kairys, The Governmental Handgun Cases and the Elements
Underlying Policies of Public Nuisance Law, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1175, 1182

(2000) ("Handgun manufacturers, like the rest of us, can be held civilly liable
for their conduct even if it falls within the framework and regulations of statutory law.").
230. H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003).
231. Id.
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House Bill 1036 would also bar the Dix lawsuit.2 32 The
Dixes' suit falls within the bill's scope because it too seeks
damages for injuries resulting from the unlawful use of a fire233
arm-the use of a gun by a minor. The Dixes' products liability claims for defective design and failure to warn likely would
not fall under the fifth exception, for products liability actions,
due to the "when used as intended" requirement. A court following the logic of the Jennings case 234 could conclude that a
firearm is not intended for use by minors, thus rendering the
exception inapplicable.235
House Bill 1036 would also necessitate the dismissal of the
suit brought by family members of victims of the D.C.-area
snipers.2 36 The public nuisance count would be barred for the
reasons noted in regards to Chicago's public nuisance claims.237
Similarly, House Bill 1036 would prohibit the plaintiffs' negligent sale and negligent distribution claims because they arise
from the criminal misuse of a firearm and do not qualify for either of the negligence exceptions.2 38 Since the defendants did
not violate any statutory provisions, the negligence per se exception is inapplicable. 239 Nor is a negligent entrustment claim

232. Dix v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. A093082, 2002 WL 187397 (Cal. Ct.
App. Feb. 6, 2002).
233. See Dix Case Status, supra note 32.
234. Jennings v. Bic, Inc., 181 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 1999); see also supra
notes 207-13 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 205-16 and accompanying text. Senate Bill 1805,
which added "reasonably foreseeable" language to the products liability exception in House Bill 1036, would not have changed this conclusion. S. 1805,
108th Cong. (2003). Senate Bill 1805 also provided that criminal acts, other
than possessory offenses, are not deemed reasonably foreseeable for purposes
of the exception. Id. Since Dix's friend shot and killed Dix, his offense goes beyond a possessory offense to include manslaughter or negligent homicide,
therefore falling outside of the scope of the exception even in a gun industry
immunity bill that adopted the provisions of Senate Bill 1805. See id; supra
note 32.
236. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 223-28 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text. As with public nuisance, the import of House Bill 1036 is that a firearms manufacturer is incapable of committing negligence unless it also has violated a statutory provision, which would permit an action for negligence per se. See H.R. 1036, 108th
Cong. § 4 (2003). The only other exceptions that would permit a negligence
cause of action are the first and the third, both of which require a statutory
violation. See id. Such a limitation on negligence flies in the face of wellestablished tort principles. See Kairys, supra note 229, at 1182-83.
239. This fact also precludes the application of the third exception for
knowing and willful violations of a state or federal law. H.R. 1036 § 4.
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a viable option for the plaintiffs. To fall under the negligent entrustment exception, a plaintiff must be able to show that the
seller supplied a firearm to a person who the seller "knows or
should know" would use the firearm in a manner involving unreasonable risk to others.24 ° Bull's Eye Shooter Supply, the defendant dealer, did not sell the sniper weapon to John Lee
Malvo; Bull's Eye "lost" it. 241 Since Bull's Eye did not know who
had obtained the firearm from its store, the requirement that
the seller "know or should know" that the purchaser would misuse the firearm is not satisfied in this case. 242 Thus, House Bill
1036 would wholly bar the plaintiffs' suit. As evidenced by
these three diverse cases, House Bill 1036 would effectively
prohibit all, or nearly all, suits attempting to hold the gun industry responsible for its contribution to the gun violence that
plagues U.S. society.
B. THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF HOUSE BILL 1036

Beyond the practical impact that House Bill 1036 would
have on currently pending suits, numerous policy considerations strongly counsel against the enactment of House Bill 1036
or any similar national legislation shielding the gun industry
from lawsuits by victims of gun violence. One of the primary
purposes that tort litigation serves is the deterrence of bad behavior.243 Giving the gun industry artificial protection from
lawsuits would remove a significant incentive for the industry
to produce safer guns and to change its marketing and distribution practices. 44 Without the prospect of liability, the gun industry remains free to continue even the most flagrant misconduct, such as that demonstrated by Bull's Eye Shooter Supply

240. Id.
241. Sniper Complaint, supra note 11, at 7. In fact, Bull's Eye has no record of any transfer of the sniper weapon from their store. Id. It appears that
Malvo stole the weapon from Bull's Eye. Id. at 15.
242. This case illustrates the hollowness of the negligent entrustment exception. The language of the exception entirely precludes its use in instances
in which the firearm has been stolen and in instances in which a middleman
purchases a firearm from the seller and subsequently furnishes the weapon to
the shooter. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
243. See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & John G. Culhane, Gun Torts: Defining
a Cause of Action for Victims in Suits Against Gun Manufacturers,81 N.C. L.
REV. 115, 179 (2002).
244. See Lytton, supra note 7, at 1254 (noting that the "threat of tort liability provides incentives for the industry to police itself").
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in connection with the D.C. sniper shootings.245 Moreover, it
would be particularly unwise to remove the restraint provided
by the threat of litigation from 246
an industry that already is subject to only minimal regulation.
In addition, gun violence is an extremely complex problem
that will require the concerted efforts of all branches of government in order to achieve a national solution.247 Neither the
legislature nor the judiciary can solve this problem alone. Yet
both branches fulfill important functions in addressing this issue-the threat of litigation and the imposition of damages or
injunctive relief by the judiciary can encourage the gun industry to monitor itself, while the legislature can craft nationwide
regulations that set standards for gun industry practices. Further, the ability of the gun industry and its supporters to influence the legislative process makes the participation of the judiciary even more critical. 24' By preventing an entire branch of
government from taking part in efforts to address the factors
that contribute to gun violence, House Bill 1036 would hinder
245. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
246. See Culhane & Eggen, supra note 107, at 303-05 (noting that regulation of firearms in the United States is inadequate). Most notably, the gun industry is entirely exempt from the oversight of the Consumer Safety Protection Commission. Id. at 304. Moreover, "[ailthough the general public may
have the impression that [the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms] has
broad jurisdiction to address all gun transactions, [its] jurisdiction is narrowly
circumscribed." Eggen & Culhane, supranote 243, at 130.
247. Lytton, supra note 7, at 1248 ("Solving complex social problems typically requires the cooperation of several policymaking institutions .... "). In
his article, Lytton argues insightfully that the tort system is a necessary complement to the legislative process in the policing of the gun industry. Id.
248. Id. at 1251 ("The tort system provides an alternative forum for policy
debate when powerful interests have squelched legislative discussion."). Telling evidence of the gun lobby's power in Congress lies in the fact that the
House of Representatives passed House Bill 1036 just two weeks before the
NRA national convention, a coincidence not lost on the bill's opponents. See
House Approves Common-Sense Legal Reform in Protection of Lawful Commerce
in
Arms
Act,
CONNECTICUT
SPORTSMEN, at
http://
www.ctsportsmen.com/houseofrepresentatives- passes.htm (last visited Dec.
30, 2003).
The defeat of Senate Bill 1805 following the addition of gun control
amendments to the bill further demonstrates the NRA's power in Congress
and its significant control over the legislative push for gun industry immunity.
Just hours after the NRA's executive vice president, Wayne LaPeirre, sent a
facsimile message to senators urging them to oppose Senate Bill 1805 as
amended, approximately sixty senators who originally supported the bill obediently voted against it. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Leaders Scuttle Gun
Bill Over Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2004, at Al; Letter from Wayne R.
LaPierre, supra note 119.
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resolution of this vital social issue.
Underlying House Bill 1036 is the larger debate over the
role that courts should play in overseeing and regulating the
manufacturing and marketing of potentially harmful products,
including firearms, via common law doctrines.249 Proponents of
House Bill 1036 often argue that the judiciary has no part to
play in regulating the gun industry, as that function falls
squarely within the bounds of the legislature.2 50 However, when
faced with a problem as serious as gun violence, it is a terrible
waste of resources to ignore the power of the common law, in
the form of negligence, public nuisance, and products liability
doctrines, and to prevent it from complementing the regulatory
measures implemented by the legislatures. Tort law and legislative regulation can and should complement each other in this
arena.
Nonetheless, the very text of House Bill 1036 seemingly rejects the need for cooperation between the legislative and judicial branches. The bill expresses misgivings about the judiciary's ability to handle litigation against the gun industry.
This distrust is misplaced. In innumerable areas of law the judiciary is called upon to assess plaintiffs' claims and dismiss
meritless suits. 252 The bill and its supporters fail to specify why
the area of gun industry liability is different-why the judiciary
is incapable of properly applying the law in this particular
field. In reality, the judiciary has proven itself willing to dismiss cases brought by victims of gun violence when the judge
considers the plaintiffs case too weak to warrant a trial.252 The
249. See generally CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA
(2001) (examining the critical and often beneficial role that litigation plays in
U.S. society).
250. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. H2969 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 2003) (statement of
Rep. Sensenbrenner); id. H2971 (statement of Rep. Boucher).
251. H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003) (stating that one of the purposes of
the bill is to avoid suits "based on theories without foundation" being sustained by a "maverick judicial officer").
252. Further, the legal claims raised in the vast majority of gun industry
lawsuits are claims sounding in negligence, products liability, and public nuisance, areas of law in which the judiciary has long wielded power. See Sayles
& Lambden, supra note 20, at 155 (refuting the notion that gun industry liability should be determined by legislatures, because "the doctrine of strict liability.., has always been developed by the judicial, not the legislative,
branch of government"). In these suits, the judiciary has merely applied to the
gun industry the same well-recognized doctrines that are applied to other defendants in countless cases each year.
253. See, e.g., NAACP v. Acusport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435 (E.D.N.Y.
2003); Dist. of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. Civ.A.0428-00, 2002 WL
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sentiment of distrust that House Bill 1036 directs at the judiciary will undermine public confidence in the ability of two powerful branches of government to work together to address the
problem of gun violence, or any other issue of national importance.254
Finally, litigation against the gun industry fulfills the important social function of promoting dialogue about the problem
of gun violence. This dialogue occurs at several levels. The litigants involved in the lawsuits engage in a dialogue between a
powerful industry and the individuals injured by its products.
This dialogue in the courts can achieve positive results with
far-reaching effects, as evidenced by the landmark Smith &
Wesson settlement and the more recent settlement between
California cities and numerous gun dealers.255 Dialogue between litigants thus can produce concrete steps toward the
resolution of the problem of gun violence.
The recent wave of gun industry litigation has also
prompted national attention to and public dialogue about the
problem of gun violence and the conduct of the gun industry.256
Public debate is critical to generate the momentum necessary
to obtain a solution to such a pervasive social ill as gun violence. Without the national spotlight that litigation brings,
public discourse about gun violence and the gun industry could
more readily be silenced.
Dialogue and the collective efforts that can spring only
from dialogue are thus essential. The enactment of House Bill
1036, or any similar national legislation barring suits against
31811717 (Super. Ct. D.C. Dec. 16, 2002); Mayor of Detroit v. Arms Tech., Inc.,
669 N.W.2d 845 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
254. Writing about state laws limiting suits against the gun industry, Lytton notes, "The success of industry efforts to obtain legislative immunity from
municipal lawsuits also threatens to undermine the integrity of the tort system, determining liability on the basis of political muscle rather than judicial
procedure." Lytton, supra note 7, at 1266.
255. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. The dialogue between
litigants also has the ability to reshape public discourse about gun violence.
Lytton, supra note 7, at 1263 ("[Bly highlighting the claims of gunshot victims
and the social costs of gun violence, lawsuits against the gun industry may reframe the debate over gun-violence policy by downplaying disagreement over
the right to bear arms and highlighting concern for public safety.").
256. News headlines abound regarding suits against the gun industry by
the victims of gun violence. See, e.g., NAACP to Sue Gun Makers, CNN, at
http://www.cnn.com/US/9907/12/naacp.guns.02/ (July 12, 1999); Christy
Oglesby, Sniper Victim Families Sue Gun Maker, Retailer, CNN, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/01/16/sniper.lawsuit/ (Jan. 16, 2003).
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the gun industry, would stifle this productive discourse and
would hinder cooperation between the legislative and judicial
branches in resolving the problem of gun violence currently facing U.S. society.
CONCLUSION
If enacted, House Bill 1036 would have a tremendous impact on the growing wave of litigation against the gun industry
by victims of gun violence. The vast majority of cases in which
victims of gun violence attempt to hold members of the gun industry responsible for the role that they play in fostering gun
violence would be summarily dismissed by House Bill 1036.
The impact of House Bill 1036 would go far beyond that of the
state laws limiting suits against the gun industry. The bill
would render the gun industry largely immune, on a nationwide scale, from negligence, public nuisance, and other wellestablished common law theories of liability in suits arising
from gun violence, unless the defendant were also guilty of a
statutory violation. Furthermore, House Bill 1036 presents a
host of constitutional issues as well as the potential for significant confusion regarding the interpretation of several of its
main provisions.
House Bill 1036, or any similar national legislation, is
eminently unwise from a policy perspective. The bill would remove a significant incentive for the gun industry to police its
own conduct. Moreover, the bill sends a disturbing message
about the inability of the legislative and judicial branches to
cooperate toward the resolution of the problem of gun violence.
Finally, the bill would stifle vital dialogue about gun violence,
both in the courts and among the public. Such a bill, therefore,
would only impede the resolution of an issue that, without hyperbole, can be termed a national crisis.

